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Notes 
The Case Against Statutes of Limitations 
for Stolen Art 
Steven A. Bibas 
In the mid-1960's, a mailroom clerk at the Guggenheim Museum in Nev. 
York City stole a Marc Chagall watercolor entitled The Cattle Dealer. Musemn 
officials did not notify the police, the FBI, Interpol, or other museums or 
galleries of the theft. In 1967, Jules and Rachel Lubell bought The Corrie 
Dealer from a reputable New York gallery and displayed it in their home for 
over two decades. After learning of the painting's location in 1985, museum 
officials demanded its return. When Mrs. Lubell refused, the museum began 
a lnwsuit that dragged on for years.1 Mrs. Lubell claimed ownership as an 
adverse possessor and under the statute of limitations.� In 1991, the New York 
Court of Appeals sent the case back to the trial court for a determination of the 
relative blameworthiness of the parties, further prolonging the litigation.' 
The balancing-test approach adopted by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Guggenheim exemplifies one of several tangled threads in the law of stolen 
! . See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubeil, 569 N.E.2d 426, 427-28 (NY. 199l) ! :wting th:lt 
iawsuit bcg�tn on Sept. 28, 1987); Richard Perez-Pcfia. Sui! 01·er Clwgali 1-\(uerco!ur Is Soiled DaY Af:er 
Tria! Swrts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at B:l (noting that lawsuit was settled on Dec. 28. 1993 ). 
2. Solomon R .  Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell. 550 N.Y.S.2d 618. 619 lApp. Div. 1990). certified 
�!lk'Stion answered und (�f!'d, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991 ). 
3. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431. After the t··ial on remand began, the partie:' tlnally settled d1 .. � 
ia-..-..·suil on December 28, 1993. Under the settlement. Mrs. Lubell will kt;ep the p::!inting. but she and th� 
two dealers who sold the painting will pay the Guggenheim Museum an undisclosed sum of mon(:\'. p,:r-:z­
Peria. supra nc)te I. 
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chattel s .4 Many of the commentators who have written about statutes of 
limitations for personal property advocate adverse possession, a doctrine 
bonowed from land law.5 Other authors endorse a multi-factor balancing of 
the equities cal led the discovery rule, an approach similar to the one adopted 
in Guggenheim.6 Related doctrines , such as the due diligence and l aches rules ,  
a lso  balance the relative equities of the part ies .7  
All of these approaches are flawed. Adverse possess ion ,  a doctrine that 
works well  for real estate, is  not suited to the very different rea l m  of movable, 
concealable personal property. B ecause it ignores an owner's diligence, adverse 
possession doctrine hurts diligent owners who have reported thefts but are 
unable to fi nd their property. Since multi-factor balancing tests do not 
automatically award title to theft victims,  they do not adeq uately deter 
trafficking in stolen goods . Adverse possession law and b alancing tests do not 
automaticall y  reward theft reporting, nor does either doctrine routinely penal ize 
the purchase of stolen property. Thus, neither approach creates adequate 
4. Though the term "chattel'' technically does not include intangible persona! property, for the sake 
of readability this Note uses "chattel" and "personal property" interchangeably because the distinction is 
not important for this Note's purposes. 
5. See infra Par1 I. B. Each author stresses a different justification for adverse possession of chattels. 
See Patty Ger:;tenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119, 163 (1988) 
( underscori ng need to protect good faith and commercial certainty); R.H. Helmholz. \Vrongflli Possession 
of Chattels: Hornbook Lmv and Case Law. 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 122 L 1235-36 ( 1986) (stressing importance 
of quieting title); Nicholas D. Ward. The Georgia Grind: Can the Common Law Accommodare rhe 
Problems of Tirle rn !he Arl World, Observations on u Recem Case, 8 J.C. & U.L. 533, 554 ( 1981-1982) 
(relying on ''the need f(Jr repose''); Comment, 14 RUTGERS L. REV 443. 444-45 ( 1960) (stressing need to 
quiet titles and bar stale claims). These recent articles have not moved beyond the older literature, which 
relied on similar reasons in support of adverse possession of chattels. See J.B. Ames, The Disseis·in of 
Chmtels (pt. 2). 3 HARV. L. REV. 313 ( 1890) (assimilating ::1dverse possession of chattels to adverse 
possession of land); John P. Dawson, Frartdulent Concealment and St(l{utes of Limiwrion, 31 MICH. L. 
REV. 875, 897-901 (1933) (favoring protection of reliance interests); William F. Walsh, Tirle bv Adverse 
Possession (pl. I), 16 N.YU. L.Q. REV. 532. 536 (\939) (emphasi zing need to bar stale claims). 
6. See infra Part l.D; see also Paula A. Franzese. "Georgia on Mv Mind"-Rejlections on O ' Keeffe 
v. Snyder, 19 SETO>' HALL L. REV. I 11989) (implicitly endorsir.g discovery rule); John G. Petrovich, 
Comment. The Recoven• of Stolen Art: Of Paintings. Statues. and Staill!es of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. 
REV. 1122, II 5 I ( 1980) (advocating discovery rule that would balance defendant's interest in repose, 
piaintitTs interest in meritorious claim, problems of proof, and hardship to faultless plaintiff). 
7. Laches and due diligence doctrines ternper· statutes of limitations by taking into account the owner's 
diligence and other factors relevant to the fairness of returning the chattel. See infra Part l.D; see also 
Sydney M. Drum, Comment. DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making Ne11· York a Haven j(n Stolen Art?, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 90Y. 942 (1989) (endorsing demand-and-refusal rule as qualitied by laches); Leah E. Eisen, 
Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, StaTutes of Limitations. and Title Disputes in the 
Art Wol'id. 8\ J. CRLvl. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I 067 . I 100-0 I ( 1991) (endorsing version of due diligence rule); 
Stephen L. Foutty, Recent Development, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg 
& Feldman Fine Arts. Inc.: Enlrenchment of r!re Due Diligence Requirement in Repln·in Actions for Srolen 
Art, 43 VAND. L. REV. I S3Y. 1841 ( 1990) (endorsing due dil igence rule): Andrea E. Hayworth. Note, Stolen 
Arrwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Prerry Picture. 43 DUKE L.J. 337, 374-83 ( 1993) (endorsing demand­
and-refusal rule as qualified by laches): Charles D. Webb. Jr., Note, Whose Art Is It Anyway.? Title Displlles 
und Resolurions in Art Thefr Cuses, 79 KY. L.J. 883,895 (\990-1991) (endorsing version of due diligence 
rule). Though these commentators treat the differences between laches and due diligence as significant. Part 
I.E notes similarities between the two and Part Il.D argues that both rules are far too vague. Thlls. neither 
rule adequately deters the buying of stolen art. 
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i ncentives to report thefts and deter the buying of stolen art.8 Judges and 
academics have been too preoccupied w ith ex post dispute resolution to see the 
ex ante impact of thei r  rules upon future behav i or. Therefore, current 
approaches fuel the market for stolen goods and encourage more thefts . 
This Note's thesis  i s  s i mp le: v icti ms of art thefts who promptly report the 
thefts to the police and to a computerized theft database should never be 
legally ban·ed from recovering their property. In other words,  statutes of 
l i mitations should not appl y  to actions brought by owners who h ave promptly 
taken two s i mple  steps to protect their legal t it les.  Often,  a so-called bona fide 
purchaser (BFP) i s  negl i gent when i nvestigating title to an artwork. Now that 
an i nternational computerized art-theft registry is available, buyers should be 
encouraged to check the regi stry and shoul d  be held l i able if  they fai l to do so.  
Part I of this Note surveys the arguments commentators h ave marshalled 
in suppor1 of statutes of l i mi tations for personal property and cons i ders the 
judicial  trend toward restricting protection of B FP's .  Courts have gradual l y  
offered more protection to owners but have done s o  ad hoc, suggesting that the 
time is ripe for wholesale legis lative reform .  Part II criticizes the arguments for 
protecting B FP's from d i l i gent owners'  clai m s .  Part III outl i nes an alrernative 
legal regime that would protect a B FP if and only if the owner h ad not 
reported the theft. Thi s  Note concludes that protecting owners by abol ishing 
l i mitation periods for many types of personal property would be both 
economical l y  efficient and morall y  j ust. 
I. LIMITATION PERIODS FOR CHATTELS: COMM ENTATORS AND COURTS 
To understand why the current l aw i s  unsatisfactory, one must understand 
what rhe l aw is and how it arose. Adverse possess ion, for instance, is a land 
law doctrine that courts first i mported into cases involving stolen animals . 
Adverse possess ion may have suited stolen horses in the l ate nineteenth 
century, but i t  works poorly for smalL concealable objects (such as artworks) 
in a hi ghly mobi le  society. Recognizing that this real-property doctrine is 
inappropriate for most personal property, courts and commentators have moved 
toward c ase-by-case balancing of the rel ative d i l i gence and b lameworthiness 
of each theft v icti m  and each buyer. Judges and academics have gradually 
recognized that theft v icti m s  often deserve to recover thei r  art from buyers of 
stolen goods . B ut because no one has advocated bright- l ine rules. the law has 
perpetuated perverse incentives for buyers not to i nvestigate title and has failed 
to encourage victims to report thefts, as Part II argues .  
8 .  The Cultural Property Implementation Act already covers cultural. archaeological. o r  ethno!t>:;i·:a! 
property stolen from another country's museums. monuments, or public institutions. 19 U.S.C. �� 2601 
2607 ( 1988). See gene wily Paige L. Margules. Note, /ntemationcli Art Theft and the 11/egol !rn{'ort unci 
Export of Cultural Propertv: A Study of Relevant Val11es, Legislation. and Solutions. 15 SU!'FOU: 
TRc\l'SNAT' L L.J. 609 ( 1992). Therefore. this Note does not deal with works that t'all under chc;! A<:t 
2440 The Yale Law Journal [Vo l .  1 03: 2437 
Section A lays out the common law rule that protects an original owner's 
title to stolen goods .  More than a century ago, American courts and 
commentators began supporti ng adverse possess ion of chattels, a doctrine that 
favors buyers .  S ection B explores thi s  approach . More recently, courts have 
drifted away fro m  protecting buyers by tempering l i mitation periods i n  v ar ious 
circumstances . I n  art  theft cases i n  particular, they have been less w i l l ing to 
find for p ossessors than most academics would be.  Sections C and D cons i der 
doctrines the courts have used to curtai l  protection for buyers of stolen art: the 
demand-and-refusal rule, the laches rule, the due d i l igence doctrine,  and the 
discovery rule. Section E considers the reasons behind the gradual eros ion of 
protect ion for possessors . When courts face real cases involving real people, 
judges and juries i ntuitively blame the possessor because he9 is usually the 
least cost avoider and is at least as negligent as the theft v icti m .  C ourts have 
increasi ngly favored owners ,  but they have done so in an ad hoc fas h ion. As 
Pan III argues , Congress should replace th is  ad hoc j udicial approach with an 
expl icit, bright-line rule that would deter art theft. 
A. The Common Law of Stolen Property 
At c o mmon law, a th ief 's  title is void . 10 The thief cannot g i ve a buyer, 
even a BFP, good t itle.'' Thu s ,  a buyer does not take title i f  somewhere back 
in the buyer ' s  chain of title a claim rests on theft. 1 2  Over the past century, the 
various doctrines of l imitation periods described below have carved out 
exceptions to this  rule. Nevertheless ,  the Uniform Commercial Code 
perpetuates the common law rule: unless one of the i imitat ion doctri nes 
applies, t it le remai n s  in the original owner. 13  
9.  This '<ote uses male pronouns for buyers and possessors and female pronouns for owners and theft 
victirns. 
l 0 . . 'iee 3 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 1 45 (describing rationale underlying actions for 
replevin and detinue: ''For there must be an end of all social commerce between m::m and man. u nless 
pri-.·are possessions be secured from u njust invasions: and. if an acquisi tion of goods by either force or 
fr:!ud were al!owed to be a sufficient ti tle, all property would soon be confined to the most strong, or the 
most cunning: and the weak and simpleminded part of mankind (which is by far the rnost n u merous 
d1vision) could never be secure of their possessions."). 
11. Kunstsammlungen zu 'Weimar v. Elicofon. 678 F.2d 1 1 50, 1 1 60 (2d Cir. 1 982); Ward. supra note 
5. at 549 & n.94. 
12. Suburban Motors v. State Fann Mut. Auto. I ns. ,  268 Cal. Rptr 1 6. 1 9  (Ct. App. 1 990); Schrier 
v. Home lnclern. Co . . 273 A.2d 248, 250-5 1 (D.C. 1 971 ); lnmi-Etti v. Aluisi , 492 A .2d 917. 923 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1985). 
D. See U.C.C. �§ l-103 (stating that pre-U.C.C. common law still applies except where displaced by 
p3rt icular U.C.C. pro\'isions), 1-20 I (32). (33) (defini ng purchase and purchaser i n  terms of passage of title 
via 'IOiuntary transactions), 2-403( I) (stating that purchaser acquires al l  title that transferor had) ( 1988); see 
dso \\!ebb .. wora note 7. at 884 & n.l2 (citing these \JC.C. sections). The U.C.C. does protect a BFP who 
buys from a seiler with voidable title. U.C.C. § 2-403( I) ( 1988). But a voidable title. whi·�h :�rises. for 
instanc�. when a check is dishonored, is very different from a thief's void title. Ward, supra note 5, at 5J.9-
50. Since�' thief has no title to transfer. not even a voidable title, a purchaser from a thief acquire,; no title. 
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B. Adverse Possession of Chattels 
1. Academic Literature 
Under adverse possession doctrine, a possessor who has actual ,  exclu s ive. 
open, notorious,  continuous, and hostile possession of land under a claim of 
right for the statutory period can take good title and thereby defeat the original 
owner ' s  claim. 1 4 Academics have long argued that adverse possession of 
chattel s  is desirable for precisely the same reasons that adverse possession of 
land is: namely, to punish the original owner 's  delay, to protect the possessor's 
settled expectations,  and to avoid the evidentiary problems caused by stale 
claims. 1 5  
S ome authors have recognized differences between realty and personalty 
but have nonetheless supported adverse possession for both . John Dawson. for 
instance, noted that the usual requirement of open and notorious possession 
does not fit chattels wel l  because chattels are movable and often 
inconspicuous . 16 Nonetheless,  he supported adverse possess ion of chattels  as 
a vvay of protecting a B FP ' s  reliance interest. 1' S i mi larly, Patty Gerstenbl i th 
notes that e ven if a possessor uses personal property openly, notoriously, and 
visibly.  a d il igent owner may stil l have no not ice of her property's 
whereabouts . 18 Thus,  Gerstenblith says ,  courts face a difficult  choice betvveen 
two innocent parties . 1'� Nevertheless,  she supports adverse possess ion of 
chattel s  because it protects commercial expectations and rewards possessors' 
good faith . 20 In her opinion, an adverse possession rule that relies on 
possessors ' good faith is a clear, predictable, fair substitute for the requirement 
of open and notorious possession. 21 
14. See JESSE OUKEMINIER & JA�IES E. KRIER. PROPERTY I 00 (2d cd. 1988). See gE"IIemi/1· CH.·\RI.ES 
C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION ( 1961 ). Note one important dJ!lerence between land and chattek 
Many jurisdictiom require that an adverse possessor have color or title, i.e .. title �esting on a document. 
See DUKEMINJER & KRIER, supra. at I 04. Title deeds exist for land. m�lking the color of title rcLjuircmcn� 
useful for weeding out undocumented claims. In contrast, because there are no stand�rd docurne;'t'. nr· titie 
for most chattels, it is impossible to apply the color of title test to chattels. 
15. See, e.g., Ames, supra note 5 ,  at 323-25; Walsh, supra note 5. at 535-36. Sn·crai •xurks t;·..:at 
adverse possession of chattels only brieAy and make the analogy between land ::tnd chatteh in oa:,sing. 
taking it for granted that the two deserve like treatment. See. t>.g., 3 AMERICAN L'.W Of' PKOi'E:RTY � 15.15. 
at 837 (A. James Casner ed. 1952); Comment, mpra note 5. at 444-45. 
16. Dawson, supra note 5, at 893-99. 
17. !d. at 897-901. 
18. Gerstenblith, supra note 5, at 124. 
19. See id. 
20. !d. at 163. 
21. !d. at 162-63. 
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By barring untimely suits by owners to recover property, statutes of 
l imitations indirectly defeat the common law rule that a thief cannot pass ti tle . 
Though most statutes of limitations for recovering personal property do not 
mention the requirements for adverse possession of land, courts have read such 
standards into the statutes .22 This approach was firmly settled by the first 
quarter of this century. The maj ority of reported cases on adverse possession 
of chatte ls  between 1870 and 1930 involved horses,  cattle, sheep, and 
mules .  23 This case law, crafted to fit stolen animals that remained i n  one 
state, did not work nearly as well when i t  was later extrapolated to cover 
smaller, concealable goods (such as artworks) that had been trans ported to a 
d ifferent state or nation. Because adverse possession of chattels unfair ly  
penalizes theft victims who cannot find their goods, many j urisdictions have 
rep laced adverse possession law with various balancing-test doctrines .24 
In the seminal case of Dragoo v. Cooper,25 Cooper sued to recover a 
stolen horse from Dragoo, a B FP who had held the horse for four years. The 
court held for Dragoo. "[W]e perceive no valid reason why the rule of 
construction adopted in suits relating to realty [ i . e . ,  adverse possession] shal l  
not be appl ied in actions for the recovery of personalty."26 The court claimed 
that the policies of quieting titles and preventing laws uits apply equally to 
chattels and land.27 The Dragoo scenario recurred in different state s ,  \Vi th 
different animals, over the next six decades.  Courts gradually imported more 
and more of the l and law tests i nto the law of chattels . One court, for example, 
stressed that a possessor had held openly and notoriously.28 
22. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840, 847 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 979), rev'd and renwndc,f nn 
other grounds, 4 1 6  A.2d 862 (N.J. 1 980). 
23. Another recurring case involved fixtures of which fo!lTler owners or occupants of land retained 
ownership, but which they left behind and only belatedly returned to claim. Courts recognized that such 
tixturc' were personal property but nonetheless applied adverse possession doctrines. See, e.g., Isham v. 
Cudlip, 179 N.E.2d 25 (Ill App. Ct. 1 962) (applying adverse possession to house sold as chattel); Chapin 
'�·. Freeland, 8 N.E. 1 28 (Mass. 1 886) (applying adverse possession to counters in general store); Preston 
v. Briggs. 16 Vt. 1 24 ( 1 844) (applying adverse possession to barn). Applying adverse possession to fixtures 
makes ;ense. because fixtures share many characteristics of land: durability, high value. responsiveness to 
investment, and locational stability. The owners could have returned to claim their fixtures at any time; 
their delay was thus blameworthy. 
24. See infra Part LC-D. 
'' 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 629 ( 1 873). 
26 fJ at 632. 
27. See id. 
28. Dee v. Hyland, 3 P. 388, 388 (Utah 1 883) (awarding title to BFP of horse even though owner hacl 
notiried sheriff, ranchers, and cattle drovers of theft). Another court noted that a BFP had been "claiming 
:tnd holding [a mue] notoriously and adversely." Hull v. Davidson, 25 S.W. 1 047, 1047 (Tex. Ci'.. App. 
i 894). One c:.1se stressed a BFP's "open, notorious, and undisputed possession [of a stolen mare! under an 
honest claim of right." Leavitt v. Shook, 83 P. 39 1 ,  39 1 (Or. 1 905). Another case rested its decision on a 
posse3sor\ having held openly, notoriously, peaceably, and exclusively. Adams v. Coon, 1 29 P. 85 1 ,  ci52 
(Old:J.. 1 913). Several cases expressly permitted tacking. E.g., Gaillard v. Hudson, 8 S .E. 534. 534 i,G�. 
I :3S9); Gatlin v. V:mt, 91 S.W. 38, 40 (Indian Terr. 1 905), aff'd .wb rwm. Vaught v_ Gatliil, ! 20 P 273 
(Okla. 1911 ) .  Tc.cking is a doctrine that permits a possessor to add the length of time his :il':l!er posse" sed 
I 
I 
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Animals are mobile and thus hard to find.  To address this problem, some 
courts interpreted the open-and-notorious test  to require that the possessor hold 
the property openl y  and notoriously i n  the vicinity of the theft: "[I]t has been 
uniformly held that the two-year statute of l imitation i s  appl icable  to an action 
for the recovery of stolen property, where the property is held in open and 
notorious possession and within the jurisdiction of the court."29 Likewi se, the 
Dragoo court declared that "departing from the state" woul d  toll the statute of 
l imitations.30 This doctrine guaranteed the owner a reasonable chance to find 
her animal and bring suit .3 1 In contrast,  where a possessor hel d  a mare openly 
and notoriously i n  the locale of the theft, he deserved title because of the 
owner ' s  "utter l ack of dil igence" in finding and recovering the mare .32 
With this refinement of the open-and-notorious test, adverse possession 
may have worked well for l ivestock in the late nineteenth century. Animals, 
l ike l and, are durable,  valuable .  and responsive to investment , such as feeding 
and medical care . The requirement of  open and notorious possession in the 
j urisdiction insured l ocational stabi lity. Animals grazed on open land and were 
visible to the public.  Many animals bore brands or distinguishing marks that 
uniquely identified them from a distance.33 Communities were much smaller 
and word of mouth much more potent.  If a stolen horse stayed in the owner's 
community for several years without being found,  it was re latively likely that 
the owner had neither actively looked for it nor alerted her neighbors. 
Punishing an owner's l aziness might have made sense in small rural 
communities-adverse possession law baned stale claims and rewarded the 
possessor for feeding and caring for the animal .34 
But this reasoning was plausible only when one could blame delay on an 
mvner's laches (i . e . ,  lack of d iligence). Over time, communities grew l arger, 
people grew more mobile,  and courts extended adverse possession to less 
noticeable goods. Furthermore, the tol l i n g  of s tatutes of l imitations for property 
outs ide the j urisdiction disappeared from the case l aw.35 These changes made 
it increasing ly i mplausible to blame owners for not bri nging suit sooner. 
Courts that had to assign the loss to one of two i nnocent pa11ies split i n  
their  approaches. Most interpreted open and notorious u s e  to mean using 
" piece of property to the length of his own possession in computing whether the adverse posse,.sion period 
has run. 
29. Torrey v. Campbell, 175 P. 524. 525 (Okia 1918) (emphasis added) 
30. Dragoo v. Cooper, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 629, 631 ( 1873) 
3 1. Carlin. 91 S W. at 40. 
32. Luter v. Hutchinson, 70 S.W. 1013. 1014 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 
33. See Torrev, 175 P. at 525 (noting thal cow had distinguishing marks. so anyone looking for her 
could have identified her). 
34. Note that rewarding possessors for caring for animals is ana logous to rewarding maritime salvagers 
for salvaging the property of another. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK. JR . . T!iE LAW OF 
AO/.l!RALTY 532 (2d ed. 1975). 
35. TI1is author hcts found no cases decided after 1918 that tolled a statute of !imitations because 
property w<!s outside the jurisdiction (except where there had been affirmative fraudulent concealment) 
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property as ope n l y  as an ordinary owner would;  these courts usuall y  s i ded with 
possessors . For example,  one c ase held that us ing a typewriter i n  pla in  vinv 
in a business counted as open and notorious possess ion . 36 AnO[her c a s e  
treated use of a v io l i n  i n  a possessor ' s  house and at music l essons as  
sufficient ly open and notoriou s . 37 In a third case,  having a piano in one's  
house sufficed as "publ ic" use, even though two witnesses testified that they 
h ad not known about the p i ano .38 Another court treated the use of bonds for 
l o an collateral as sufficient because the possessor "h [e] ld  the bonds as openly 
and notoriou s l y  as the nature of the property would permit .  ·d9 
A small m inority of courts read "open and notorious" as requiring u s e  that 
an owner was l ikel y  to discover; these courts usually s ided with owners .  The 
S upreme Court of Californi a  he ld  that using a piano in one ' s  house "was not 
open and n otorious,  but c l andestine,  and the owner was without the means of  
knowing i n  whose possession i t  actually was ."40 An Oklahoma c ourt asked 
whether the possessor held a d iamond ring "openly and notoriousl y  . . .  within 
p l aint iff ' s  v i c inity so that plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity of knowing the 
r ing ' s  whereabouts .".J 1 Utah law went even further and tol led the s tatute unt i l  
an owner had actual knowledge of facts that should have put her on notice .J2  
These cases began the trend toward insuring fa irness to owners .  Thi s  focus  on 
the owner ' s  knowledge and culpabi l ity presaged the laches and discovery rules,  
d iscussed below i n  Part l .D.  As a result  of these concerns ,  such m aj or 
j u risd ictions as New York and New Jersey have abandoned adverse possession 
law in  favor of balancing-test doctrines.43 
C. The Demmzd-and-Refusal Rule 
One l ine  of cases holds that an owner ' s  cause of action agains t  a BFP does 
not accrue until  the owner demands that the B FP return her property and the 
-----------------------·--- ----
36. Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. B i vens-Corhn Co., i I ')  P 2J 5 8 _  59 (Okla.  i 04 1 1 . 
_'7 _  Reynolds v. B agwe l l .  1 98 P.2 d  2 1 5 ,  2 1 7  (Okla. 1 948) :  t/ Uni ted States -.. One S trad i variu s  
Kie,;dwdter Vio l i n ,  ! 97 F .  i 57 .  1 59 (2d C i r. ! '1 1 2 ) ! keepin g v io l i n  on t�thie � � t  home �end show ing i t  t o  
guests prev·er.ted to! ! ing of statute of l i m i tations for concealment: not  < �n  adverse possessiun case, however)_ 
33. Connor \ .  Rl\vki n s .  9 S. W. 684, 685 (Tex I 888 ) _  The reported opin ion sheJ.s nu l i ght on whc' 
these \'.:� tr�e�;��s vvere . Presumably. they \vere cal led to tesu fy becau.•;e they v.:ere Jcqut.�l n tcd wi th  the 
pu:-,sessor. 
J Ll Joseph '-'. Lesncvich,  1 53 A.2d 349, 357 ( N .J. Surer. Ct. App. Div .  1 95 9 )  While  the paragraph 
r"rorn which the quot::nion comes discusses the lack of fraudulent  concealment. the preceding paragraph 
rn�.kes clear that pos;ess ion need only be open and notorious enough to negate a charge of fraudulent 
conceal ment, reg:).rd!ess of an O\vner's i gnorance. 
-10. San Frrmcisco Credit  Cleari ng Bouse v. Wel l s ,  239 P. 3 1 9, 32 1 (Ca l .  1 92 5 ; .  
4 i .  R i esinger's  Jewelers, I n c .  v .  Roberson. 5 8 2  P.2d 409. 4 1 3  (Okla.  Ct.  A p p .  1 978 )  (holdi ng thoJt 
v·.v n c r ' :-;  opportunity to know ring1S \'>''hereabouts was substLtntial question of t�act prec l uding su n1n1ary 
jud g:nc n t ) .  
42. I'vi<;dsen ;. iVladsen. 269 P. 1 32 .  1 34 ( Utah 1 928) .  
-:3 .  Se< inji·d Part ! .C-D.  
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BFP refuses .4-l I n  contrast ,  a cause of action arises at once aga i n s t  a thief or  
other wro ngdoer, and so n o  demand is necessary.-'5 For examp l e ,  the  demand 
n:quiren1ent protects a BFP from cri minal prosec ution for possession of a 
s to len car u n t i l  t he O\v ner has demanded i ts return and the BFP h as refused.  
The rat ionale for demand and refu s a l ,  i n  contexts o ther than l i m i tat ion periods,  
i s  thCtt t he BFP, u n l ike the thief does n o  i n te nt i o n a l  wrong by holding the 
property and therefore should not be liable u n t i l  made a ware o f  the owner 's  
cla im.4A The req u i rement fosters pri vate dispute resolution and i mmunizes a 
BFP fro m  c i v i l  and cri minal l i ab i l i ty for the taking (though he m ust s t i l l  return 
the property) . .)� In other w ords,  the rule is supposed to protect a BFP by 
postpon i ng l i abi i i ty  u n t i l  after he learns of the theft v ict im ' s  c l aim and refuses 
to h onor it .  
Without  exam i n i n g  the p o l ic ies behind the rule , several c o urts  have applied 
the demand-and-re fusal  requ irement to tol l statutes of l i m itati o n s  until  the 
owner makes a demand and the possessor refuses to return the property . .Jx 
Though this  version of the rule extends to all types of c hattel s ,  a n u mber of 
these cases have in volved stolen an or artifacts .�9 Since t h i s  rule al lows the 
O \v ner to  bri n g  sui t  no matter how much t ime has e l apsed between the theft 
and her demand, courts that sympath i ze w i th owners use the rul e  · 'as a b u lwark 
against  the handiwork of evi l ,  to g uard to rightful owners the fru i ts of the i r  
\ abors . · ·:i' l 
Though sympathy for theft v ict ims is understandable ,  the method chosen 
tu protect these victims i s  not . The pure demand-and-refusal  req u i reme n t  
c v i �.cerates l i m itation periods by a l l o w i n g  o wners to postpone m a k i n g  a 
demand i ndetl n itely. l t  helps th ieves.  Cor whom the s tatute of l i m itations runs 
-+·+. SeF. t ' . g  . . (J ! I k t  v. Robens. 57 N.'( 2� I l i)/4} .  Ndtc that i..krn�tnd-ant.i-rcfusal cases cornc pri mari ly 
:·rurn Nt\\' YorK cuurh. 
-+5. See. e .g . .  o · connel l v. Ch icago Park Dist. 3-l f\i . E.2J 836. S-lu ( ! ! ! .  1 9"1 1 l  ( hulJing that. where 
p�.)s:,e:-i� ion w��s ton i ou ;; at outs..:t. i i 1n i tat i on perioJ bcg�1n r u n n i n g  ��t once �tnU Liter  den!Jnd did not stan 
ir run ;1 i : ig 'tga i n ) ;  So !onwn R. Guggenhcirn f'nund. v. Lube l l .  569 N . E::cl 426, -+29 ( N . Y. 1 9<J I ) : 
Ccr�tt.: n b i i t h  . . \.!ipru note 5, :.tt i 39 n . 6 1  
-�6. Gersr. c n b l l t h .  sur,ru i l ( 'J te .5 ,  a t  ! 32<:; 3 .  
-+ 7 .  /d. a t  1 33-J-L 
4 �\ .  i:'. g . . Kun>t :; 1 m rn l u ng�n zu Wei m ar v. E l i c o i o n .  678 F2J I i 50. 1 1 6 1  ( 2d C i r.  1 9 C\ 2 )  ( deal i n g  with 
an ' tuien i n  WoriJ War J i ) ;  Goodbody & Co. v. McDowel l ,  )J() F2d i l -!9 .  1 1 5 1  (5th Cir. 1 976i ! >hare' 
ot' :'lUC K ) :  Repub l ic ot" Turkey V, Merropol i tan iVluseum ur i\rr, 762 F. Supp.  H . .:J-5 t S D. N . Y. ! 990 1 
( �'t rt ! fi.:.CLS Stl)kn frun1 Turk i s h  buria!  mounds ) :  i n te r:, uuc �·; l fg .  Co. \'. I n terst�te Prod s .  Co . . 408 P.�d ..J./8 .  
-+S l (,i\lon t. 1 �65} ( 1nachinery and po\ver wJ.go n ) :  Guggenlu: im, 569 N . E .2d at 4 29 (stolen Chaga1l  
w :llcr,�olor;;  i'vknzei v. L i ;t. 267 N . Y. S .2d go-l. 809 r Sup .  Ct. 1 966) (Chctga!l pa' n t i ngs plundered by Nazis) .  
modified un r;!hcr ..;u>! lnds, 279 �! . Y.S .2d  60:) l Ap!). D iv. 1 967). modi_/imrion rn· "d. 246 N . E.2d 7.:1-2 (N.Y. 
! ';J6S}) : St..'t:' ulsu Du 1·y�:a v . . --\ndre1.vs. 1 2  �..,: Y. S .  -+2 .  -L) ( S up .  C t .  I R90) ( hold i r:g Lhat statute of l in1 i t �H ions 
began tci r u n  up(m demand for return of sto len hor�c:. but not rncntioning r�fus(.} l ) .  
-l-9. Sec: ,  e .g . , cases c i ted SIIJ-!ru no te .+:). �/fany of  the (·ascs ( i tcJ i n  t h a t  foot note a r c  frorn Ne'.v York . 
8 e c [iU :.-e �'-Jew York is an Qrt mecl.:.:t � �nd m<.my m u s e u m  plaint i ff� :.t:;; rhcrc.  m �my· stolen art cas�s fal l \\'i thin 
the der.1arh:l --and-rc:fns�_d rlJ!e.. 
50. i'v/::n:.e! . 267 ;\i. 1  . . S .2J �tt 8'20: sl· e � : ;'su KiliiS!s�unm!un,�en �u \ Vc·inwr. 678 F2J at I ! 56 ( ;· u l i ng  on 
- t: i t  by pbinr iff ··.d1�. 1 :11�1d,� dt,; m ��nd 2 1  ye�ir�.- <-LFl·:r th�ft'L 
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at once,5 1 \.vhile harming innocent buyers .  And far from serving its original 
goal of protecting a B FP from lawsuits,  it makes him perpetually vul nerable 
to suit .  
Because of these problems , most courts have abandoned the pure form of 
the rule. S ome cases have addressed these problems b y  running the l im itation 
period from the time when an owner first gained the right to make a demand 
( i.e . ,  the time of the theft or conversion) .52 This change effectively abol i s hes 
the demand requirement. Other cases , as the next Section shows,  h ave used 
l aches and due diligence doctrines to soften the demand-and-refusal 
requirement. 
D. Laches, Due Diligence, and the Discovery Rule 
Courts in chattel replevin cases have adopted doctrines variously  labeled 
as l aches, due dil igence, and the discovery rule, all of which rest on ad hoc 
bal ancing of myriad relevant factors .  Cases such as Guggenheim have appl ied 
the doctrine of l aches to insure that an owner does not delay in locating the 
possessor and making a demand.53 This approach involves a m ulti-factor 
b al anci ng of all the equ ities , including the owner ' s  dil igence, the buyer 's  
behavior, and prej udice to  the buyer.54 For  instance, though the Guggenheim 
Museum never reported the theft, the court left open the possibil ity that the 
museum could recover if other factors weighed in its favor 55 This balancing 
method resembles the discovery rule discussed below. 
One S econd Circuit case, De Weerth v. Baldinger, interpreted New York 
law as requiring an owner to use reasonable dil igence to !ocate and demand the 
return of stolen property 56 The court laid down no guidelines for hov; much 
d i l igence would suffice, saying only that dil igence "depends upon the 
circ umstances of the case."57 B ecause the owner had neither pub l ic ized the 
theft nor used post-World War I I  mechanisms for recovering stolen art , the 
S econd Circuit reversed the d istrict court's finding of di l igence as 
erroneous .5� As a federal court si tting in a diversity action, the Second Circuit 
5 1 .  Sr:e supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
52. See. e .g . . A I -Roc Prods. Corp. v. Union D i me Sav. B ank.  425 N Y.S .2d 525 ,  526 ( App. D1v. 
1 980): Fede1·a l Ins .  Co. v. Fries. 355 N .Y. S .2d 74 1 ,  747 (Civ. Ci .  1 974); see nlso Stroganoff-Scherbatoff 
v. We ldon, 420 F Supp. 1 8 , 22 n . 5  iS D.NY. 1 976) (dictum). 
53. See. e.g. , Republ ic  of Turkey v. Metropolitan M useum of An. 762 F Supp. 44. 46-47 ( S . D . N . Y. 
1 990) ;  Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lu bel l .  569 N. E.2d 426, 43 1 (N.Y. 1 99 1 )  Two comme n t ators 
c1dvocate th is  appro�1ch .  See Drum. supra note 7, at 942-43: Hayworth. supm note 7. at 3 7 3 .  
5 4 .  See. e . g  . . Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 43 1 .  
55 .  See id. at 43 1 .  
56. il36 F.2d 1 03,  1 08-09 ( 2 d  Cir. 1 987) ,  cert. denied. 436 U . S .  ! 056 (1988). Severed c o m rn e n t ato!·s 
<:JJdorse th is  ;:pproach. See Eisen.  supra note 7, at I I  00; Foutty, supm note 7, at 1 860: Webb. supra 1 1 <Jte 
7. at 395.  
57 .  De Wcr:nh, 836 F2d at 1 1 0 ;  see also Foutty. supra note 7 .  at 1 860 i ' " [ D jeterm i nation of due 
J i ! igcnc� i ,;  fact sensitive and must be made on a cl!se-by-case basis . . . . ) . 
5 8 .  De Weenh. 836 F.2d at 1 09- 1 2 .  
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purported to predict how New York courts would rule .59 But shortly 
thereafter, the New York Court of Appeal s ,  in Guggenheim, rejected the due 
diligence rule  as a misunderstanding of New York l aw.60 Indeed, because the 
facts of each case differ, the Guggenheim court rejected the very idea of 
codifying what actions constitute laches or diligence . 6 1  
S e veral courts have explicitl y  adopted a so-called discovery rule for the 
recovery of chattels ,  usually in cases involving stolen art.62 Under the rule, 
courts balance a l l  the equities of the case,63 including when a dil igent owner 
would have l ocated the chatte l ,  in deciding whether it would be fair to tol l  the 
statute of l imitation s .  In 0 'Keeffe v. Snyder, for example, Georgia 0' Keeffe 
sued a B FP for replevin of three stolen paintings .64 The intermediate court 
applied adverse possession law and held that a possessor could not gain title 
without displ aying art openl y  and notoriously in a museum.65 The New Jersey 
S upreme Court eschewed adverse possession law because it ignores an owner ' s  
actions and because the test for open and notorious use of  land does n o t  fit 
most chattcls .66 Instead, the court adopted an equitable  discovery rule,  
focus i ng on the owner ' s  diligence but also considering "the equitable claims 
of all parties . "67 Unlike adverse possession, the discovery rule p laces the 
burden on owners to justify deferring the limitation period.6� The court 
refused to l ay down rules about how diligent theft victims should be.69 The 
two other art cases applying the discovery rule have likewise interpreted the 
59. fd at I 06. I 08. 
60. Solomon R. G uggenheim Found . v. Lu be l l . 569 N . E.2d 426, 429-30 (N. Y 1 99 1 )  
6 ! .  /d. :Jt 430-3 1 .  
62 . .A.utocephalous Greek-Orthodox Churc h  o f  Cyprus v. G ol dberg & Feldman Fine A"ls.  I nc  . . 9 1 7  
F. 2 d  278 .  :2S8-89 ( 7th Cir. 1 990) ( app lying discovery rule to stolen mosaics ) ,  arl. denied. i 1 2  S Ct .  377  
( 1 99 1  l :  Senfeld v .  B r:m k of Nova Scotia Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd . 4 5 0  So.  :2d 1 1 5 7 .  ! I 62 ! Fl a .  Dis t .  C t .  
A p p .  J 9S4) (app ly i n g  di scovery ru le  t o  stolen money) ;  O' Keeffc v. Snyder. 4 1 6  A . 2 d  8b2.  870 ( i ' U .  i 980) 
(app l y i n g  di scovery ru le to action for replevin of stolen pai nt ings) :  see a/sn Mucha v. K i n g .  792 F.2d 602. 
6 1 1 - 1 2  (7th C i r. 1 9 86) ("Althou gh the t ide i n  I l linois  is runn in g strongly in favor of the d i scovery rule . 
it must  remain a matter o r· speculati on whether an I l l inois court would apply i t  i n  a case such as th i s  
" ) : CAL. Civ.  ?ROC. CODE § 338(c)  \West Supp. 1 993 ) (adopting disco very rule tor· stolen artworks 
and scientific and hisrorical art i facts); PRELI:VIINARY DRAFf Ut,IDROIT CONV ENTIO'-i 0'-i STOLEN OR 
ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTU R A L  OBJECTS art . 3(3) (Int'l Ins!. for the U n i fication of Private Law 1 993 ) 
( U n i droit Study LXX-Doc. 40) (proposi n g  harmonization of cou mries· laws. under which statute of 
limitations for cul tural obj ects would run from when owner knew (or. alternatively. should have k nown) 
of object's whereabouts) .  
63 .  This ru l e ' s  vagueness i s  the fault  of the courts, which have never enumerated l i sts uf w h at factors 
rn�mer in this  i nqu i ry or how heav i l y  to wei ght each one. They merely te l l  the finder uf fa,:t to detcm t i nc 
w hCit would he fai r  in all  the circumstances. including the c i rcumstance of when a reasonabl y d i l i gent o w nc: ;· 
would have found h e r  art. 
64. 4 1 6  A.2d at 864-65. 
65.  0' Kee ffe v. S nyder, 405 A.2d 840. 845-46 ( N.J. Super. Ct. App. D i v. 1 979 ) .  ,.,, d und rctnw;;!d. 
4 1 6  A.2d 862, 863 (N.J. 1 98 0 ! .  
66. 4 ! 6  A . 2 d  a t  87 1 -72. 
67. Jd. at 872 . 
08 .  !d. at 873.  
69.  Se" 'd. 
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rule as requmng a fact-specific inquiry into the equities and the amount of 
di l igence required .  70 
Despite the profusion of l abels ,  the laches , due di l igence, and discovery 
rules are s i milar if not equivalent. These flexible balancing tests weigh the 
owner ' s  d i l igence a n d  delay, the buyer ' s  innocence a n d  rel iance, t h e  existence 
of prej udice , and other equitable factors. For instance, the discovery rule l ooks 
at when the owner knew or should have known of the art' s  l ocation . One 
cannot, however, assess when an owner should have known without first 
asking what steps a d i ligent owner should have taken, and s o  the discovery 
rule is  akin to due d i ligence . 
Two commentators advocate a due di l i gence approach based on guideli nes 
for what buyers and owners must do to preserve their right s . 7 1 They claim 
that the law cannot set out definitive standards for evaluating due d i l igence i n  
al l  circumstance s .  7 2  Instead, courts should deve l op "rebuttable  
presumption [ s ] "  based on a buyer's checking theft registries a n d  b uying from 
established dealers . 73 These rules of thumb would also require theft victims 
to publicize searche s ,  check catalogues of an art ist 's  work, and notify the 
police .  Neither author, however, proposes any bright- l ine  standards . 1·1 
Likewise, the d i scovery rule  is quite flexible.  Three commen tators endorse the 
d iscovery rule b ecause of its equitable,  flexible multi-factor b a l ancing test.7" 
Note that the laches,  d i l igence, and di scovery doctrines are much more 
favorable to theft victims than is  adverse possession.  These new ru l es give 
victims some power over when they lose their rights to sue. T he increas ing 
prevalence of these rules  i s  evidence of a trend toward protecting many theft 
v ictims at the expense of BFP's .  The next Section speculates about why courts 
have moved in thi s  d irection.  
70.  See Autocephalous G reek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v .  Goldberg & feldman Fine 1\ns, Inc  . . 9 I 7 
F'2d '278 .  289 !7th C i r. 1 990) ("[T [ hc due d i l igence determ i nation is . h t g h l \  " Ltct-scns t t t \ e  and must 
be dec ided on a case-by-case bas i s ." ' )  (quot ing  Autocephaluus Greek-Orthodox Ch urch ui Cyprus ' · 
(]old berg & feldman Fine Ans, Inc . ,  7 1 7  F Supp. 1 374, 1 3 89 ( S . D .  fnd .  1 98 9  J l .  cert. denied, ! ! 2 S. C. 
3 7 7  ( I  99 1 ) ;  Mucha v .  King, 792 F.'2d 602.  61  l ( 7th C i r. i 9 8 6 )  ( not ing th�t couns w i l l  not  � p p l y  d iscuverv 
ru le  " if  problems of proof created by the passage of time outweigh the hardsh ip to a p la i ntiff who cou l d  
nut a s  a pract ical matter have sued a n y  earl ier than h e  d id ." ) .  
7 1 .  See Webb, supra n ote 7 .  at  896-98; Eisen,  supru note  7 ,  at 1 092 .  
7 '2 .  See Webb, supra n ote 7 ,  at 897 ("[N]o e xhau stive qandards for wh :lt constitL:tes due d i l igence 
could be set out to cover e v e ry s i tuation . . "): E isen.  supra note 7 .  at I 092.  
73 .  Webb, supra n ote 7 ,  at 897.  
74.  !d. ; Ei sen, supra n ote 7 ,  at  1 092. 
7 5 .  See Petrovich.  supra note 6, at I 1 56-5 7 :  see u lso Franzese . . l'llpru note 6. at 2 2  ( o b l i que ly  p r< • i s i n g  
discove�y mle i ;  Ward, supra note 5 ,  at  54 1 (endors ing di scovery r u l e  i n  pass ing) .  Because the di scovery 
mle  someti mes subord inates a possessor's repose to a d i l igent mvner 's  ri gh ts , the lead i ng proponent of 
adverse possession for c hatte l s  crit ic izes th is  mle .  ln Gcrste n b l i t h ' s  view, O 'Keejfi' "si gn i ficantlv 
u ndermines the policy of the statute of l im i tations" favoring repose and u nfair ly  ass i m i lates an i nnocent 
possessor to a \vrongdoer. Gerstenb l i th,  supra note 5 ,  at ! 44 .  S h e  prefers adver:,c posses:�illn bcc2.use : t  
focuses on the possessor's  acts and good r�ith rather than the owner\ di l igsn c,.:. !d. at 1 45 .  
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I nterestingly, though most academics endorse l imitation periods for 
chattels ,  courts have been much less enthusiasti c .  As noted, courts have 
i ncreas i ngly tempered statutes of l imitations in ways favoring o wners . In the 
ten reported cases involving art or artifacts i n  which possessors invoked the 
statute of l i m itations,  the only two that held for the possessor relied on the 
owne r ' s  utter l ack of d i l i gence i n  locating the art .76 Five of the cases ruled 
for the owner outright.77 Three other cases proceeded for further fact finding,  
despite evidence of the owner 's  l ack of d i li gence i n  two of them.78 
This j udicial drift favors d i l igent owners and even some not-so-d i l i gent 
owners out of sympathy for theft victims. Courts have become i ncreas i ng ly 
uncomfortabl e with awarding title to possessors because possessors often buy 
under suspicious c ircumstances w ithout i nvestigatin g  title. For instance, one 
buyer bought two priceless fifteenth-century Dlirer paintings for $450 from a 
former soldier who showed up at the buyer's  home and cl aimed to have bought 
the paintings in Germany. 79 In another case, an art dealer purported to believe 
a s e l ler 's  story that an unnamed ai l ing archaeologist had suddenly deci ded to 
sel l  rare Byzantine mosaics.  Though the mosaics were in Munich, the 
American dealer rushed to c lose the transaction in S witzerland, a country to 
which buyers of stolen art fl ock in order to cl aim S wiss l aw ' s  protection of 
buyers 80 Even when there are no affirmative hints of theft, buyers often do 
l ittle to investigate t i tle,  relying solely on a sel ler ' s  word. x 1  
S ome courts have given owners leeway even w h e n  they have n o t  been 
d i l igent. A lthough the 0 'Keef e court backed away from an extreme pro-victim 
doctri n e ,  it  left open the possibi l ity of recovery despite the owner's fail u re to 
7b. De\Vcerth v. B aldi nger. 836 F.2d 103. I 1 1 - 1 2  (2d Cir. 1987 ) . c er/ .  denied. 486 U S  1 056 11988): 
Desideri o v. D ' Ambros io .  463 A . 2d 986, 93 8-39 ! N .J .  S uper. Cr. Ch. Div. 1983). 
7 7  Autocephaious Gr·eek-Onhodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Ans, Inc , 917 
F 2d 278 ( 7th Cir. 1990 ) , cerr. denied, 1 12 S. Ct. 377 (1991); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th C i r. 
1 986 ) :  Kunstsarnrnlungen zu Weimar v. Eiicofon. 678 F.2d 1 1 50 (2d Cir. 1 9 82) ;  Redmond v. New Jersey 
H istori c a l  S oc ' y, 28 A.2d 189 ( N . J .  1942) :  Menzel v. List.  267 N . Y. S .2d 804 (S up . Ct. 1966), modified on 
Nher grounds. 279 N.Y.S .2d 608 (App. Div. 1 967). modification r�v·d, 246 N.E.2d 742 iN.Y. 1 969) .  
7 8 .  Republ ic  of Turkey v. Metropol itan Museum of Art, 762 F .  Supp.  44 (S .D.N Y. 1 990 ) ; 0 '  Keeffe 
-. . S nyder. 4 ! 6  A . 2d 862 ( N .J .  1 980) ( not rng evidence of owner's lack of di l i gence);  Sol omon R. 
Guggenhei m Found. v. Lube l l .  569 N.E .2d 426 ( N . Y. 1991) f sarne ) .  
/ 9 .  5<'<' Kllnsisan!mlun;.;en .�II  Weimar, 6 7 8  F.2d a t  I I 55-56. 
80. So· Stanley Meis ler, Art & iharice, L.A.  TIMES,  Nov. 12, 1 CJ89, iVL1gazine ,  at 8. l 0- 1  1 .  The facts 
Jescri bed i n  the text gave rise to the A utoceplwlulls Greek-Orthodox Ch urch case . 9 I 7 F.2d at 279-84. 
Even Pablo Picasso was gu i l ty of i gnoring h i n ts of theft. When a friend sold him sto len Iberian 
sculptures that Picasso h.:.d ,;een in the Louvre. "deny it though he might. Picasso must have realized 
nact ly \vhat he was being offeree!."  John Richardson.  Picasso Anwng Thieves. VAI\ITY F.<\ IR, Dec . I 993 . 
;.tt 1 98 ,  204. i'k verthcles> ,  because "he had to possess these objects," Picasso "de lud[ed j  himself'  i nto 
;H:cepl i n g  the th ief ' s  s tory. ld. at 204, 224-.  
3 1 .  E. g  . . Poner v. Wertz, 416 N . Y. S .2d 254. 257, 259 (App. Div. 1979 l ( noting that buyer did n o t  
i nqu i re about se l ler 's  reputa b ! l i t y  nor h i s  tit le to paint ing,  i n  keepi ng with custom among buyers that "it  
i s  deemed pnnr prJ.ctice to probe ' '  i n to ti t le } .  
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search for the painti n gs unt i l  twenty-six years after the theft .  82 In the 
Guggenheim case, the museum had not notified l aw enforcement agencies ,  nor 
had i t  notified other museums , galleries,  or artistic organizations .83 On the 
other hand, the buyers could have d i scovered Guggenhe i m ' s  o wnersh i p  by 
consulting a catalogue of Chagal l ' s  work, but they had neglected to  do so.84 
Noting that the equities did not favor either party, the court deci ded not to bar 
the owner's c l ai m  despite its l ack of d i l i gence. G i ving too much protection to 
buyers, and p l ac ing the burden of l oc ating stolen art on owners , "would,  [the 
court] bel ieve [d], encourage i l l i c it trafficking in stolen art."85 The court c ited 
Governor Cuomo ' s  fears that craft ing a rul e  too favorable to buyers \vould 
make New York a haven for stolen art.86 Accordingly, the court "place[d] the 
burden of investigating the provenance of a work of art on the potential 
purchaser" and remanded the case for an equitabl e  balanci n g  of the part ies '  
c l aims.87 
The Guggenheim case i s  reveal ing.  Even where the owner could h ave done 
much more to recover the art, the court refused to favor the buyer for fear of 
encour aging theft. The court recognized that buyers have the power to 
investigate provenance and, by doing so, can curtail the market for stolen art. 
It therefore saw no moral reason to favor buyers and treated both p arties as 
equal ly gui l ty. Note that the gal lery that sold the painting to the Lube l l s  bought 
it from a dealer who had bought it from the suspected thie f. x8 Evidently, 
neither the dealer nor the gal lery had thoroughl y  verified the art ' s  title .  If the 
iaw p l aced the loss on buyers, a buyer could sti l l  recover the v al ue of the art 
from the gallery by s u ing for breach of warranty of title .s9 Art dealers , as 
repeat p layers , are wel l - suited to investigate title and to spread the risk of l oss, 
'v hich suggests that the l aw sh ould ultimately place l osses on dealers . Part I1 
develops these ideas further. 
Judges and j uries have felt the need for change, but they st i l l  operate 
within a framework of outmoded doctrines.  The next Part e x p lores the themes 
of fairness and abi l ity to investigate and shows how they undermine the 
arguments for favoring buyers over d i l i gent owners under any c i rcumstance s .  
Because courts have chipped away a t  statutes of l i m itations for buyers . the l a w  
i s  i n  flux and thus breeds l itigation.  The flaws e xposed i n  the next Part support 
a wholesale retreat from statutes o f  l imitations . It is time to crystal l ize the 
82.  O" Kc:�ffe v. Snyder. 4 1 6  A . 2d 862, 866 ! N.J .  1 98 0 )  
8� .  S o l o m o n  R.  Gugge n h e i m  Fou n d .  v. Lubel l ,  5 6 9  N . E.2d 426, 428 ( N . Y. 1 99 1 )  
84.  S o l omon R .  Guggenheim Found. v. Lube l l ,  550 N . Y. S . 2 d  6 1 8 , 6 2 3  l App.  Div .  1 990).  cerrificd 
qu�stion m1.mered and (!f! "d, 569 N . E.2d 426 ( N . Y. 1 99 1 ) . 
85 .  Guggenheim. 569 N . E . 2 d  at 4 3 1 
86. !J at 430. 
3 7 .  !d. at 43 l .  
R S .  Sec id J.t 4 2 3 ;  Ptrez-Peila, supra note 1 .  
SQ .  Sei'. e.g . . tv.lenzel v. Li st .  267 N . Y.S.2d 8 0.1. i\08 ( S u p .  Ct. 1 966) ( noti ng th:Jt buy·�r who i1ac: r o  
rei.u r·n [":t i n t i n g  to o w n e r  recouped i ts  m:�rket val u e  from gal lery that solc.J p � i n t i n g  to huy.�rl. n;o,/ifi,·d. 2 :9 
>i Y S . :�d  GD� l A pp. D ! v. 1 967) . nwdificoriun re;'d. 246 N .E.2d 7.12 ! N .Y ! 969 ) .  
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courts ' vague intuitions into a rule clear enough to provide guidance to buyers 
and theft victim s .  
I I .  THE C ASE AGAINST PROTECTING BUYERS O F  STOLEN ART 
The gradual j udic ial shift i n  favor of theft v i ctims suggests that current 
rules protecting buyers of art and other chattel s  are unsatisfactory. Proponents 
of statutes of l i m i tations rely on three related arguments :  l i m i tation periods 
i ncrease the marketabi lity of chattel s  by obv i ating burdensome title 
investigation; they protect  morally blameless possessors ; and they prevent 
courts from becoming mired i n  evidentiary problems raised by very old, so­
called stale c la ims.  First, this Part rebuts these three arguments . Section A 
argues that, though l i m itation periods are touted as fostering marketabi l ity of 
c hattels ,  max i m u m  marketabi lity i s  not a virtue but a vice because it faci l itates 
art theft. Section B refutes the moral arguments for protecting buyers.  Section 
C contends that v al ues of justice,  effic iency, and i nternational comity outweigh 
the problems rai sed by stale claims and that, i n  any event,  old claims do not 
cause many evidentiary problems.  In addition to rebutting the three arguments 
l i sted above, this Part rai ses  one independent obj ection to the current law. 
Section D crit icizes the discovery rule,  l aches, and due d i l i gence doctrines as 
too v ague and thus too unpredictable to generate proper incentives.  
A. Focilitoting A rt Soles Encourages Theft 
Many commentators argue for l imitation periods by noting that they 
increase marketabil ity of chattels  by quieting title .90 In other words,  statutes 
o t' l imi tations foster commerce by l imiting or obviating any tit le search that a 
buyer must undertake before buying an artwork. This argument rests on the 
unstated ,  fl awed premise that the law should always max imize marketabi l i ty. 
B ut the l aw ' s  goal should not be to maximize marketabi l ity per se, but rather 
to achieve optimum marketabi l i ty by inducing buyers to weigh the costs of 
investigation against its benefits . 9 1  If art h as a readi ly  d iscernible ,  honorable 
provenance, there is no i mpediment to its sale. The cloud over an artwork's 
t itle arises when its provenance i s  unclear or questionable.  But this  i s  prec isely 
where the law should make buyers cautious and encourage them to investigate. 
In some cases ,  buyers buy under suspic ious c ircumstances.92  B uy ers often 
90. Se�. e.g. , Gerstenbl i th .  supra note 5, at 1 60-6 1 ,  ! 63 ;  Helmholz,  supra note 5, at ! 23 5 - 3 6: 
Comment. supra note 5 ,  at 444-45. 
9 J Courts should not, hov.:ever. e1nploy vague, case-by-case balancing tests to \Veigh these costs and 
;_,e neti ts .  See infra Part II.D. A bright- l i ne rule placing l iabi l i ty on buyers would make buyers i nternal ize 
the costs of searching and the costs of not search ing ,  producing an opt imal  amount of i nvestig�tic- n .  Sec 
inji·a text accompany i ng note 1 53 .  
92 .  See supra notes 79-SO and accompanying text. The i nquiry i n to a possessar\ goc�d L: i r :-� 
neccs:.;.ari l :;,: re l i e s  on his  testin1ony and version of the events.  A s  Part I I . D  �ngu c s ,  this m;_tkes it l_i i fficu l t  
2452 The Yale Law Journal [Vo l .  1 03 :  2437 
rely on a gallery ' s  reputation without requesting any other evidence of  t i tle 93 
'· ' [I ]n  an industry ·whose transac tions cry out for verificat ion of  . . .  t i t le . . .  
i t  is  deemed poor practice to probe . . . .  " '9·1 Even reputable auc t i o n  houses 
such as  Sotheby's have been known not to investigate title. 'Js 
Statutes of l imitations may have been necessary to achieve optimum 
marketability in a bygone era when investigation was difficu l t, costly, time­
consuming,  and incomplete. B ut today, buyers and merchants c an readily 
investigate title .  They can consult a catalogue raisonne of an art i s t ' s  work to 
determine the lineage and most recent ownership of each work 90 And,  s ince 
1 99 1 ,  they have been able to  consult  an international computerized database 
of s tolen art. 97  
Because s tatutes of  l i mitations promote maximum marketabi l i ty  rather than 
optimum marketabi lity, they increase the profitability of art the ft  and thus 
encourage more thefts. As of 1 990, art theft was second o n l y  to drug 
s muggling as the most lucrative crime in  the world ,% in vol ving two to s ix  
bil lion dollars worth o f  art each year.99 One q u a rter o f  these thefts happen i n  
America. 1 00 Thieves operate according t o  t h e  lmv of supply ancl demand;  the 
demand for s tolen art fuels  thefts . 1 0 1  Logic and anecdotal evidence sugge:;t 
many cases for courts to di scern ex post when a poss•cssor cou l d  �mel should have dnne m o re ''' i n q,_s t i gatc 
Therefore. i t  i s  be tter to create i n cent ives  by plac i n g  the r is� of loss on possessors c-.; �1n tc .  
93 .  See. e.g. , Men ze l v. Li st, :246 N .E.2d 742 .  7-+3 t �i .Y. 1 9691 i ' Th� [ ddcn-:!:.mt'> l knC'.\. n <:: : h i ;;g nf 
the pai nt ing's  prev ious h i story �md made no i nquiry concerning i t .  being conter.t to rely on ! he reputab i l i ty 
of the Paris gallery as to authenticity and t i t le , . ) .  
94. Porte r  v. Wertz. 4 1 6  N . Y.S.2d 254.  259 l App. Oi ':. 1 Sl 79 1 r quoting di str ict  C<l t ' > t "pi n ; ,,/ 1 ) , nc' : i n ;  
th��t buyer d i d  n ot invc·:-t igatc �e l !er\ reputabi l i ty nr veri fy c l a i m  C1 f c);,vn,�r�h i r ) :  s [ · e  c �l.,· ( ,  () ' Keeffe '­
S nyder. 4 1 6  A . ::'d  8ti2. S 7 2  ( N .J .  1 98 0 )  ( . . [ P [ai nti n g s  worth vast sums of money su:n d t i nc·s are bought 
\V i thout  i n q u i ry �bout the i r  proven:·,ncc . · · ·J ;  J ames \Vahh.  It :\· u S'u·nl, Ti\lL. Nov. 2.:� .  i 99 : .  � t t  .�6. ;�. 7 
( S[:.lt i n g  that. accord i ng to New York Pol !cc  un dctecti \·c R i c harJ Volpe.  art thie\'O::S :-itL.:cecd o n l y  throug�1 
negl igence or complici ty  of gal leri e :; and co!lcctnrs l. 
95. See Grace G l ueck . \V/;o OH'tU Stoien ,·\rlljac() ('ollrJ:Sf' Conjronrs i 1  ,\tfuse:un, :\ . Y. T l .\ i ES .  r\rn  
�0, 1 9Y 1 .  at :-\  l .  8 .3  ( i mp ly ing  r_ hat. t h o u g h  Sothc: b y ' s  so ld  aniL�cl :.t:Jd L"t1ccLed :·ur pn:�:. i b it.:  i l leg:_d 
exportati o n .  1t d i d  not i n ve,t i gate poss i b i l i ty of thett ) :  Carol Vogel .  iv!u.\ e!lll! ,I( eel's Sw!cn A rr!f(u ; Co!ie�e 
Gels Cush, N .Y Tt\I ES .  Apr. I I .  1 992.  at A 1 4  ( same ) :  s,·c also 0-!enzcl v. L i :; t .  26 7 N Y. S . 2 d  :)1).;. 00<) 
t S up.  Ct.  1 966) ( " A rt gai lerics of such st:.1 1H.l i ng assun1c. ·-.v i thoul the necessity of  i n q u i ry, that an �-.l(:--:>r (d 
sale cons t i tutes a represe ntation of auLhent ic i ty �lnd good t i t l e ... ). mnd�_fit:d on (Jl/zer groun:ls. 279 N . ·Y.S . 2 d  
6 0 8  ( App . Div .  1 967). nwdifiuuion rn· 'd. 2 4 6  N . E.2J  7 .\ 2  ( N . Y  l lJ69 i. 
96. A curutoc�·ue  raisonnd ! s  a detl n i t_ i vc l i s t i ng (usu;:diy by a prumincnt  �1rt �:: \.pert ) uf  �:>:c ry kilU\\'il 
�u1work by a part i c u lar art i s t .  Fc1r each \�:ork.  lhc cawloguc u s u a l l y  conta in;-;  ; ;  r:h; -.; Jc � : l  de :�._: rip � ion 
!. i nc l ud i n g  a n  i l l ustrat i o n ), a hi story of exhib i t ions  of the wor�. the  work\ proven ance,  and pub! i :;he : l  
reference:-; to  the \};ork. l!sua i iy, one catalogue b�con1cs the def1 , � i t iYc reference: wor�: on \l."hich :-...::hfdars 
�1.nd n1erchants rely when discussin g  an :1rt is l · �  work�. See De \Vecnh \". B.1ldi nger. � 3 6  F. =:c� ! ! n .  ! 1 � t :2d 
C i r.  1 987) :  l'vlary lvlcKenna. Comment .  Prnhlemutic Pro� ·enance: ToH':tl"f. l u Cohere.:u {. i.· z i fi.'(/ Staies .'-'r:[ir:\· 
on rhe lntenwrinnul Trade in Culture!! Propdrry, i 2  U. P:\ . J. INT' L B L;S .  L .  8 3 .  l (Li n . �;2 9 i i ')1. l ) / . 
9 7 .  lnternotiuual An Loss RegisttT Opens Jfn· Business . .-').,RT.'<E\VSLF.TTER ( l nr. ' l Fou :xi. r·ur :\r� 
Research, New York. N . Y.) .  Feb. 5 .  I 99 1 .  l.l\ I :  s,-,. ulsn infi-o Pan I l l  ( ctdvocc:t i n "  solu t ion ba>d c•:: 
i n ternation�d databases). 
98. Don L. Boroughs et a \ . .  The Iiiddcn A rl r:( Th:!jl. f..) .S .  N ::-.. , ·s :._\:. \VORLD REP., Ar;r. �. l 990. 3 "  ; ' 
':!9 .  Wahh. Sllf'r<l note 9+. at 86-8 7 .  
\ 00 .  :V I  aria Fucnt�2 .  A n  Thefts: Boid .)'n·nkcs Turn u ?u�_tir: FBi Cr{!cks Do\\'.'� u '>· C'rin!t 'S Niv � · .  T .� ·\ 
TODAY. June 29, 1 993 ,  at B .\ .  
1 0 ! .  !d ( " ! B ]ecausc drt s ti l l  fctchc� goCJ(j lliOne:y. . · � t l h<::ft i s  i ncrl.!a�: i ng !·or ·. f ! !C  � -��l .� l ) n :  ��r=>�· .J" 
. . .  · ' '; i quoti nE! Donalc..l ;\1 a:;on_ ex-FB1 :lrt theft i n \·�_qj g�nor i :  PiL·us::ns -�tnr! Rruqu .. . ·_.. S:ni:·n _f"-·. · 1 i l  .'� /!; ':, ' : , , - -
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t h at l aws protect ing buyers have encouraged theft and created havens for 
laundering stolen an. 1 02 B ecause buyers presently bear the costs of 
investigatim: t it le but do not internalize the costs of fai l i n g  to invest icr ate the " � v � v ' ) 
do too l ittle t it le searc h i n g  and buy too much stolen art. 
I nstead of  max i miz ing marketabi li ty  by protect ing buyers of stolen goods, 
the l aw should create i ncentives for buyers to i nvestigate provenance. 1 03 B u t  
adverse possess ion law, b y  foc u s i n g  solely on a possessor 's  acts of possessi o n  
after purchase. maximizes marketabil i ty a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  fai l i n g  to c reate 
incent ives to invest igate. And the d iscovery rule,  l aches, and due d i l i gence 
tests are so unciear that,  as Part II .D argues, they do not g u i de behavior. 
B e c ause these ru les  do not strongly encourage in vestigation , they also c reate 
too much m arketab i l i ty .  B y  fac il itating art sales,  the l aw fac i l i tates art theft .  
B .  Buyers Do Not Merit Repose Because Owners Who Report Thefts Have 
Momlly Stronger Claims 
Some authors argue that l imi tation periods for chattels  are good bec ause 
. , J oc� 'Th b . they protect possessors repose .  ese commen tators seem to e arg u m g  
that a possessor mora l l y  deserves repose.  T h i s  arg u ment  rests o n  the fal l ac ious 
premise that a possessor has a stronger moral claim than an owner who has 
reported a theft. 
First, because a buyer c an eas i l y  invest igate an artwork' s  provenance, he 
is negi igent if he fai l s  to investigare fu l l y. When the owner has not i fied 
author i t ies  and t heft databases ,  a buyer i s  more culpable even if  this bl ame 
--- --------- ------
:'-i . Y  Tl \ l r:s_ "'o'·- 9_ 1 993. at C�iJ 1 ' ' 1 -" i' the price pf masterpieces h as soared. the b l ack -market demand 
has �cpr pctcc. i n sp t ring  ihcfr.s " \ ; Wal sh .  1 u,nru note '14. at �6 l " [ l ] n satiahlc demand for artworks and 
cu r t i q u i t i c:s - - has raiscu pnccs anu so cncumagcd t h eft ) ;  sec 1\'k i s lcr. supru Jh)le 8 0 .  at 3 7  ( " ' I f  someone 
·sa ; ;\.' to cJ\1 '� l :w:-Co l u ;nb ian ani i n  the l ' n i tcu S tat.:s. people w i l l  bring [ the art [ to the Uni ted St:!tcs. - - � 
1 q u oting /vi ex ican offici  ell Marcntes 1 .  
1 02 .  F o r  i n s t:>Jll'C. Switzerland harbors --notori ous auct ion s . . .  whose mai n purpose i s  to establ ish  
dedc nt ia ls  t'or a , lub i (Jli:< \\'<)rk' ot an. BCJ.\1\ I E  B L' Rt'; l ! .o,;-. 1 ,  Ti lE ART CRIS IS  45 ( 1 975 ) .  In the c:�sc < >f  the 
s10kn Cypriot Hyzan t i ne mosaic:; di scussed abO\'C. th e  ;;ale touk pi:�cc i n  a Geneva airpon. presumably 
i.lc:c:�u;;c of S w i tzcri:tnJ·s  i:�x l:�w;;_  i\·le i sicr. supro note SO. at I I .  B ritai n ' s  anachronis t ic  protection ol '  those 
who buy stolen goods frcHn a few ;;tuwtori i y  designateu "march0s ou1-erts" h:1s m:�de those markets 
"cl::aring houses for s to len goods. So biawrrt  is  th i;; abuse that a Dan i;;h tour company au·:eni;;es coach trips 
tu B crmondsey [ i n  Lonuon I in the early hou r;;, to buv ;;to len good;;." Harriet Crawley. Forger th,o Vi,/e,j. 
11 :< iimr Puintin.>-:s n er ·r� Aji'er, D.·\ I L'>' TELEGRAPH ( Lonuon). June 1 6. 1 992.  at 1 6 . Many other cuuntr i co. 
h�1vt: bx l aws th�t  protc:-�t buye rs and su encourage art l aundering. Ser: Boroughs et a ! . .  supra no te 98 ,  at 
i 3 [ lkcrv i n g  japan's  lax laws ) :  Consunce LO\\'Cil th : d ,  The ]U[WIICSC Connecrion . w.,\LL ST. J . .  l\'iar 2' . .  
1 990. a t  i\ 1 3  ( same); Walsh. supru note 9.:1. a t  8 7  ( noting lax i ty of bws r n  S\\·itzerland, Liec h tcnsre i n .  and 
Cav rn:�n is lands ) :  i.f I r v i n  Molotsky. 3 U.S. Age11cics U1se cew of An-Claim Bili. N . Y  TLviCS. J u ly 2' .  
l % 6 .  at C :  5 (report i n g  that S tate Dep;.;nme nt, Justice Department. and U n i ted State:; I n formation Agency 
urged Gov.  Mario Cuomo to vcw 'hort slatu:e of  l i m i tations for recovering  ar·t for f'ear of making New 
'r'ork a h;1ven for sLolen art and encouraging theft ) .  
i UJ .  The ! a's shou i d  �d�o i ncrcu:)c i ncenli\"CS for owners t.o report thefts so th�!t buyers c a n  f i n d  out 
ctbu,n s to l e 11  artworks. Se� inj/'u Pan l ll .A- 8 . 
I 0-L Se:: Da\:..:son, supra nolc 5 .  at 397 & n . 6 3 :  Gersten b l i th. supru note 5. at 1 60-6 1 .  1 63 ;  \V<-trd . 
. '�'tlpru n o cc :;, at .554 ,  5 5 8 :  sec u!so H t l n1hnlz.  sur1ru lll1tC 5. :lt i 236-37 ( e nclors i n g sec urity of pos:-;c�sor
' :) 
: i ilel .  
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does not amount to bad faith. Commentators oversimplify the s i tuation by 
talking about two innocent  part ies ;  a b uyer is  l ikely to be several s hades more 
culpable than an owner who has reported the theft. 
B uyers often buy through art dealers and galleries. Those buyers claim to 
be innocent  because they rel y  on the advice of reputable professionals .  This,  
however, i s  an insufficient reason to exonerate buyers . The issue i s  not only 
whether buyers in fact rely on merchants , but also whether w e  thi n k  that 
buyers should rely on merchants w ithout seeing evidence of a title search. In 
other word s ,  the efficiency and practical ity of title investigation should 
influence the law's assessment of innocence. Current law does not g i ve a buyer 
enough incentive to make sure that h i s  seller has verified title .  Furthermore. 
in deciding where to place the loss,  one must cons ider the actual i ncidence of 
the loss : who w il l  actually wind up paying the bi l l?  If the loss  fal l s  on the 
buyer, the b uyer can recover an indemnity from the vendor for breach of 
warranty of title under the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 05 Thu s ,  the real 
choice is between placing respon s ibi lity on the theft victi m  and p l acing it on 
the merchant (or the buyer if there is no solvent merchant) . 1 06 A s  
knowledgeable repeat players , merchants can spread the r i s k  of  l o s s ,  insure 
against  i t ,  and develop routine title search procedures .  In addit ion,  merchants 
are more b lameworthy than theft v ictims because they h ave bought (directly 
or indirectly) from a thief. When buying art from a nonmerchant, a buyer 
could spread the risk of loss by purchasing title insurance . 1 07 The cost of 
such insurance would be proportional to the s ize of the cloud around the title, 
thus making stolen artworks much less marketable. These factors al l  s uggest 
that the law ought to place the loss on the buyer In order to encourage 
merchants to verify title and to encourage art buyers to buy from reputable, 
solvent merchants who i nvestigate . 
I 05. See U.C.C.  � 2-3 1 2( I )(a) ( 1 988) (stating that every sale contract inc ludes warranty of t i t le) ;  
Deborah D. Hoover, Note, Title Disputes in rhe Art Marker: An Emerging Dutv of Care for Art ivferchanrs, 
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 449-50 ( 1 983). 
1 06 .  One might ask why the law shou ld pl ace losses on buyers if the law's  u l t imate aim is to make 
losses rest on  merchants. There are good reasons to p l ace l iab i l i ty on buyers even though they w i l l  usual ly  
recover i ndemn i ties from merchants. If  on ly  merchants wen! held l iable, buyers would have an i ncentive 
to bypass art dealers, because dealers would have to increase p u rchase price' to retlect the risk of be i n g  
h e l d  l iable.  I n  contrast, placing l i abi l i ty on buyers w o u l d  encourage them t o  d e a l  with reputable, solvent 
merchants who investigate. Buyers would have strong incentives not to buy from fl y-by-night or i nsolvent 
merchams because, i f  they did so, they m ight be u n able to recover i ndemnit ies .  By serv i n g  as self- i nsurers 
or taking out t i t le  insurance on behalf of all their customers. merchants would perform a risk-spreading 
funct ion.  To protect themselves from l iabi l i ty and disrepute, these merchants would i nvest igate artworks' 
provenance. In short, p lacing l iabi l i ty on merchants to the exclusion of buyers would drive buyers i n to 
shauy back-al ley  transactions;  p l acing l iabi l i ty on buyers but providing for i ndemn ities from merchants 
would bring art sales aboveground, fac i l i tati ng the kind of scrutiny that would make the sale of stolen art 
d ifficu l t  and u nprofitable. 
I 07 . Title i nsurance may not have arisen yet because in temationai art-theft databases are a very recent 
phenomenon.  See Gregory Jensen .  Worldwide Registers Botrle A rt Tl1efi Epidemic, WASH. TIMES, June 1 4 , 
I 990, at E3. Now that they exist ,  it should be pos,ible to use these databases to estimate risk and set a 
p:·c m 1 un1.  
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As Part II .D argues,  case-by-case determ ination i s  unre l i able  and costly, 
inadequatel y  deters thefts , and creates collective action problems.  Thus,  the law 
should p l ace the risk of loss on that c l ass  of persons more l ikel y  to be 
b l ameworthy, n amely possessors . Doing so would create the certain,  
predictable ,  ex ante i ncentives needed to deter carelessnes s . 10 8 
Finall y, one can draw an analogy between an i nnocent owner ' s  ign orance 
and disabi lit ies such as i nfancy, insan ity, and i mprisonment, a l l  of which tol l  
the running of  adverse possess ion o f  land. 1 09 In  these cases,  the l aw 
subordi n ates a possessor ' s  repose to an owner 's  fair chance to bring an action . 
Likewise,  where an owner cannot bring suit  out of blameless ignorance of who 
has her c hatte l ,  the l aw should treat her ignorance as a di sabi l ity and so toll the 
l im i tation period . 
It i s  i mportant to dist inguish  owners who report thefts from o wners who 
do not. The l atter, by sleeping on their  rights, may have i nduced detrimental 
rel iance by an i nnocent purchaser. They may have less than honorable motives 
for not reporting,  s uch as try ing to evade state, inheritance, and capital gains 
taxes upon recovery and tryi ng not to provoke a tax audit. 1 1 0 Even honest 
moti ves for not reporting are often selfish,  such as a des ire to avoid drying up 
the market for a stolen artwork and thereby driving i t  further underground. 1 1 1  
As Part II.D argues , this motive i s  rational for individuals but col lectively 
encourages art theft because not publ icizing has the ex ante effect of 
encouraging future thefts . The l aw should solve this  collective action problem 
by pressuring all theft victims to report thefts and by rewarding them for doing 
so .  
C .  Stale Claims 
L i mitation periods are often justified as a way of foreclos ing stale 
c l ai ms . 1 1 2  According to this argument, old c laims present thorny evidentiary 
p roblems.  Witnesses die;  memories fade;  receipts disappear. Rather than 
a l l ow ing a theft victim to sue a BFP ' s  heir who has no knowledge about the 
dece ased B FP's  purchase, or trying to reconstruct  missing evidence, the law 
should a void these vexing questions. By refusing to hear suits brought after the 
statute of l i mitations has run ,  the law promotes judicial economy, insures 
fairness  to possessors, and deters delay in  bringing suit.  
Even if abol ish ing l imitation periods would i nduce more old c laims,  other 
values outwei g h  the costs of stalenes s .  First, abol ish i ng l i m i tation periods 
1 08 .  See infra Part II. D. 
! 09. CALLAHAN, supra note 1 4, at 75.  
! 1 0. See Judd Tully, Hot Art, Cold Cash, J. ART, Nov. 1 990, at 1 ,  4 (suggest ing that art theft vict ims. 
t o avoi d scrutiny by tax collectors. do not report thefts).  
i 1 1 .  See Solomon R .  Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell .  569 N.E.2d 4?.6, 43 1 (NY 199 ! ) . 
l !  2. See supra note 1 5 . sources cited there in ,  and accompanying text .  
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would abolish the perverse incentive to drive art u nderground for the statutory 
period . Second, we have i ncreasingly accepted problems of staleness as the 
price of j u stice . Many tort victims c an not discover their inj ur ies or the c auses 
of those i nj uries for many years . In  such cases,  fairness to i n nocent victims 
and deterrence of tortfeasors support relaxation of statutes of  l i m itations .  For 
example, asbestosis and medical malpractice c ases that arise fi fty years after 
the alleged torts present proof problems, but competing values (such as fairness 
and deterrence) requ i re us to tolerate staleness . 1 1 3  Likewi s e ,  in  adverse 
possession of land, we tolerate stale claims brought by an owner s u ffering a 
disability against  a possessor; fairness to the disabled trumps staleness . 1 1 �  A n  
owner 's  inab i l ity to fi nd her stolen art i s  analogous to a d i s abil ity. When an 
owner has reported a theft, staleness is a price worth paying for j ustice . 1 1 " 
Furthermore, very stale c l aims are not a large problem for the l aw of  
replevin .  Even without l imitation periods,  an owner would not  brin g  a century­
old claim, s ince her evidence would have decayed to the point that she would 
1 1 3 .  See. e.g. , Fernandi v. S tru l l y. 1 73 A.2d 277 (N.J .  1 96 1 )  ( e xtending l i m i tat i o n perilld out  of  
fairness to patient who did not  immediately discover wing nut that surgeon had left in  h e r  abdomen ) .  
1 1 4. See supra text accompany i ng note I 09. 
1 1 5 .  For e x am p le ,  the values of just ice and i n ternational com i ty shou ld  out•xeigh the prob l e m s  of stale 
c l aims i n  suits by fore ign nations to recover their national treasures . Many p l ai n t i ffs in U.S e�rt cases have 
been nati ons seeki ng to recover treasures p l u n dered from the i r  muse u m s .  g rave s . �1nd churc h·� s .  See. <'.g . . 
Autocepha lous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Fe Iuman Fi ne Arts.  i n c  . . 9 i 7 F 2u ::: 7g 
( 7t h  C i r. 1 990) ( a l l o w i n g  Republ i c  o f  Cyprus a n d  chu rch to recover mosaics stokn from c h u rc h i .  ce1'! 
denied. I I :?. S. C t .  3 7 7  ( 1 99 1 ) ; Kunstsam m l u ngen zu Wei mar \'. E l i-:ofon, 673 F.2d \ I SO (:?.d Cir. i 'Jf-; 2 )  
(a l l ow i ng Federa l Repu b l ic o f  Gerrn;Jny t o  recover pai n t i ngs apparent ly  stolen h y  .-\ m e ricetn G l  fl'om 
m useum duri ng World War I I ) :  Republ ic of Turkey v. i\1ctroro l i tan i\ l u .seum u t· :\ l't. 762 F. S u pp. ,q 
( S . D . N. Y. 1 9'J0) (a l low in g Turkey to sue to recover· art ifacts exca\'ated fn.11n bur ial mou nds ) :  W i l l iam H .  
Honan. / 1  's Finu/1.1· A g reed: GermanY To Reguin u Srulen Trrn•e. N .  Y T I\H·:�.  F e  h .  26 .  i 0 9 ::' .  at C 1 5 : \ Lu1 
Rose, Greece Sues j(Jr MYcenaean Gold, ARCHAEOLOGY.  Scpt.-Oc· t .  \ 993 .  �!t 26: ,.,,<' uiso LkWecrth '- .  
B ald i n ge r. 8 3 6  F2d I 0 3  (:?.d C i r. 1 93 7 )  (ho l di ng u n t i m e l y  s u i t  b v  \Ves t  ()crm�m r ; : ; t i l) iu! t o  rcc"vcr pai n t i n g  
:;to l e n  from home by A meri c an G I  duri ng World Wctr l l  ) .  c e rr  denied. �K6  U . S  I IJ)( ,  \ 1 9::\:) 1 :  John 
Darn ton, Repmriaiing rile lnvenrorv of Hisrory. N.Y Tl\i ES .  Sept. I ' J .  1 993 .  � .l :. \\.eek i n Rc\ icw ; . at l 
L i m i ts on p l u ndered fl;Jt ions'  r i ghts to recover m i g ht h arm re l at ions w i th these coun t ries .  For examp l e .  
N e w  York considered enact ing a short statute of l imitation:; for a rt  i n  museums w replace i t s  dcmand-and­
rcfus;JI ru l e . Molotsky, mpru note ! 0:?., at C 1 5 . But the U S.  State Depart m e n t .  ltht ice  Dcparunem, �md 
U n i ted S tates I n formation Agency al l stron g l y  urged Governor Mario Cuunw ro vcw the h i ! L  it!. He did 
ve to the measure, c i t i n g  i n adequate notice to other countr i es and the State Departme n t ' s  fears that New 
Yor� would become a haven for looted an. The strenuous object ions of the three t'eckrai agen·� i c:; suggco, t ·; 
that restric ti n g  fore i g n  countries' rights to recover stolen art would str:,in diplomatic rela�ions.  Cj U::O\.". RD 
D .  D U BOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 1 20 ( 1 97 7 )  ( notify t h a t  nations "!.eel u b l i gated tu �id a fri e n d l y  
nati on i n  recove ri ng o n e  o f  i t s  d i sp laced national  treasures") 
For s i m i iar reasons, Congress refused to pass the C u l t ural Property Repose Act. which would h�:\ c 
es tab l i shed a fi ve-year statute of l i m i tat ions for fore i g n  governments.  S. 1 5 2 3 ,  99th Con g . . l st Scss. r 1 9 :)5 ) :  
1 3 1  CO:"'G. REC. E2249 (daily ed.  lvlay 1 6, 1 985)  (state men t o f  Re p .  Gepharclt, d i scus s i n g  H.R.  :339\ ;  s�e 
Drum, supra note 7, at 9 1 9 . The C u l tural Property l m p lement;Jt ion ,:..u a l ready protects other n a t i o n s ·  ri ghts 
to recover s to l en cul tural, archaeological, and eth nologi cal property. S.ce supra note 8 .  Pru,ecti ng nat ions ·  
ri ght to recove r  stolen an wou ld further the comity con cern s t h a t  t h e  Act part ia l ly acld;·esse:; 
\Vh i l e  ;1 longer statute of l i m i tat ions would arneli orate these prob l e m s .  i l  \n.ndd no t cun1p le tc ly  :-:n] \ -e 
them.  ,.\ny arti fic ial l imitation period would cut off ;J nation's  right to recov.:r C�ftcr an uhi tr<Jry n urnbcr L • t' 
y�ars (except for a balancing test, which would be subject to the o bject ions i n  hrt l l . D J  As the c�rses c i ted 
abo ·cc show, decades often e lapse before nations locate stokn artworks. Thus, l i m itat ion ren ods \';vul:J 
u n fni riy pt2 n a l i ze n ations that d i l i ge n t l y  attemp t to reco ver their  J.rt. resu l t i n g  tn d i p ! un1�u ic  fri u i on .  
Cornpared t o  t h e  t w· i n  val ues o f  fai rness an d corn i ty, st�lcnes:� i s  a m i nor C<)flCCln.  
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be un able to bear her burden of going forward with the evidenc e . 1 1 6 Thus ,  
even w i thout a doctrine o f  de j ure l imitation periods for c hatte l s ,  proof 
problems would often result in de facto l imitation periods. In those cases i n  
which a vict im c a n  satisfy her burden of proof, however, statutes o f  l im itations 
arbi trari ly foreclose suits  that are not trul y  stale .  Additionally, an owne r ' s  
desire to get art b a c k  a s  soon as s h e  l oc ates it ,  before h e r  evidence decay s ,  
should discourage delay. 1 1 7  To protect a B FP whose evidence h a s  decayed, 
a court could take these proof problems into account in  its decision on the 
merits ,  i nstead of using a statute of l imitations to foreclose the suit as a 
threshold matter. Furthermore, i f  all  thefts were reported to a computerized art­
theft database, the database would serve a recordkeepi n g  funct ion by 
preserv i n g  theft reports and evidence of title investigations by B FP ' s . 1 1 " 
Finally,  clear rules req uiring i mmediate reporting of thefts and immediate suit  
upon discovery of an artwork's  location (as proposed in Part III) would further 
deter delay by theft v ictims.  
D .  Discoverv Rules, Laches, and Diligence Tests Are Too Uncleor 
Courts that use the discovery rule for recovery of chattels  have adopted a 
flex ible version that rel ies  on a multi-factor balancing of the equit ies and 
c ulpabil ities of the part ies .  1 1 9  Likewise,  courts have softened the demand­
and-refusal rule by i mporting a laches inquiry that balances the relat i ve 
blameworthiness of the parties .  1 20 Several commentators endorse multi-factor 
balancing i n stead of adverse possession bec ause the former is more 
t-lexible . 1 2 1  One court that applied a due di l igence test refused to J ay out 
s tandard s .  1 22 Even the two commentators who favor c learer vers ions of due 
! i 6 .  Granted. o ld  su i ts \'. OulJ sti l l  have some nu isance value;  p la int i ffs might  therefore seek l ucrative 
set t le me nts by bri n g i n g  merit less strike suits. Courts could al levi ate this  problem by u s i n g  summary 
j udgment aggressively to weed out sui ts lack ing evidentiary support. 
1 1 7 One could arg ue that a fraudulent c l ai mant ("pseudo-owner") might  wait m any years and then 
cume forward after o. purchaser ' s  ev idence of  ownership hGd decayed. But there i s  l i t t le  reason ro th ink that 
t ;wny pseudo-owners would come forward. Even i f  pseudo-owners d i d  make clo.ims.  they wou ld  face 
mult ip le  lcpl obstac les under the rule advocated in th is  Note. Most i mportantly, a theft v i c t i m ' s  recove t·y 
of property from a BFP would be barred if the v ict im had not  i m mediately reported the loss to registries 
and to the pol ic·c. who could i n vestigate claimed losses. Second. pseudo-owners would need to adduce other 
t '- i de nce of cn1 nership. such as a receipt .  testimony of  others. or an insurance company l i s t i n g .  These p i eces 
of e v idence would be subject to adversarial testing, which should weed out perjury and forgery. Third. art 
changes h ands ;x:riodic�i ly .  and at each sale buyers would check theft registries under this  Note's plan. See 
;r,fru Pan l l l . A .  Thus, the i ssue of theft is l ikely to be resolved with in  a decade or two of a cheft l i s t i n g .  
T h e  o n e  ncept ion  i s  f o r  art held  by museums. but museums keep good records and should  therefore be 
�bie to re!ute spurious :l i k��tJons Fnurth, the law could i m pose c i v i l  and crim i n al penal t i e s  for fraudulent 
c iJ.i n1s .  
1 1 8 .  T'ne Art Loss Register. 2. computerized art-theft database. keeps a record o f  a l l  searches .  See 1nfra 
n o te ! 46 .  Th i s  record would allow a B FP to verify that he had usee\ the database to i nvestigate ti tle . 
1 1 9 .  See supru te.·d accomp�m y i n g  notes 62-70. 
i 20 .  See  st�pra. t e x t  accon1panying notes 5 3-54. 
1 ., ,  J ..... t .  See Sllfl rtl n ote 75 and accornpanying text .  
D�Wee:1h '-'. B a\ ci i r: �er. 836 F2d 1 03 .  1 1 0 ( 2 d  C i r. 1 98 7 )  ("The question of what corNi t u te ·. 
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dil igence l ikewise shy away from bright-l ine rules.  Under C harles Webb ' s  and 
Leah Eisen' s  approaches,  the l aw would require art theft victims to use "the 
best help available" but would give no definitive guidance as to what methods 
are best. 1 23 
Flexibil ity is i ntuitively appealing.  Supple guidelines al low j udges and 
j urors to take account of the equities i n  individual cases, enab l i n g  courts to 
mete out i nd i v iduated justice.  Furthermore, for many years there was no s ingle 
best  way of reporting thefts and investigating title, so the l aw was u nable to 
prescribe a hard-and-fast rule for all cases.  
Nevertheless ,  the flexibility of these tests i s  a l iabi l i ty, not an asset, 
because they are too vague. Under l aches and discovery rule s ,  courts must gaze 
at the entire set of facts and pick the more deserving party. This approach 
gives parties no guidance ex ante about what they are supposed to do. For 
instance, the Guggenheim court, in the name of flexibility, refused to set out 
any "common standard [s]" of d i ligence for owners to follow. 1 24 Vague 
balanc ing tests fai l  to create c lear incentives for an owner to track down her 
goods and for a possessor to investigate an artwork' s  provenance before 
buying.  For deterrence to work, sanctions must be predictable and certai n .  
These muddy rules d o  not assure that a possessor will  pay for h i s  neglect, and 
therefore do not deter a possessor ' s  negligence in investigating title.  The 
murkiness of these rules breeds l itigation . It makes settle ment less  l ikely and 
summary j udgment imposs ible because of the need for a ful l  trial on the 
equities upon remand. 1 25 And vagueness can breed subj ectivity and 
arbitrariness.  
Even the clearest proposals that have been offered are not c lear enough. 
Webb ' s  and Eisen's proposals for rebuttable presumptions and guidelines 
would be an improvement over current standardless doctrines .  Howe ver, Webb 
and Eisen sti l l  insist that "no exhaustive standards for what constitutes due 
di l igence could be set out to cover every situation . " 1 26 By requiring v ictims 
to "seek the best help availab le" while refusing to specify which methods 
would be necessary and suffic ient, 1 27 these proposals are v u l nerable to the 
unreasonable delay in making a demand . . .  depends upon the c ircumstances of the case."). cen. denied, 
486 U S I 056 ( i 988) 
! 23. Webb , supra note 7 ,  at  897;  see also Eisen,  sllpra note 7 ,  at ! 092. 
\ 24 .  See Solomon R .  Guggenheim Found. v. Lubel l ,  569 N . E.2d 426. 43 1 (N.Y. ! 99 1 )  ( holding that 
dur ing further proceedings ,  trial court would have to balance all  equi ties and c ircumstances. but refusing 
to l ay out guidel ines as to how d i l i gent  owner must be). 
! 25 .  See id. 
l :Z6 .  Webb, supru note 7, at 897;  see also Eisen.  supra note 7, at 1 092.  
1 27 .  Webb. supra note 7.  at 897.  A charitable read ing  of Webb's argument might stress tha� becc�use 
i nformation technology w i l l  evolve, JUdges should be able peri odica l ly  to update the steps owners and 
buye r.; should take. Even so. this Note's approach would work better. First. updati n g  of reporti ng duties 
s!"10u!d occur through clear legi s l ation rather than ad hoc cases so that owners and buyers have adequate 
notice. Consider an C!nalogy to !and registration: i f  the law to id buyers to register in ·'the best systems 
ava i lable··  racher than in the county clerk's office, the unclearness would breed confusion-{!ven i f  courb 
ha.j th� pLw:er to make ad hoc detem1 i nations of which system would be best. Second. even if registries 
l 
j 
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same unclearness obj ections made above.  1 28 B ec ause of the advent of a 
computerized art-theft database, it is now possible to spell out exactly what 
steps theft victims and art buyers shoul d  take. A s  Part III argues,  the l aw 
should c raft a c lear rule that rel ies on this new technology. 
It might seem that trial courts would appropriately penalize a possessor ' s  
negligence a n d  reward an owner's rel ative innocence in most c ases .  B ut this 
argument ignores the problems with ex post adj udication . B alancing tests are 
u nreliable because they force courts to rely on a possessor 's  self-serving 
testimony about his  state of mind and the steps he took to investigate. 
Furthermore, and most important of all ,  theft victims suffer from a 
col lective action problem. For each individual owner, it may be a rational 
"tactical decision" not to publicize the theft and thereby avoid driving the 
stolen art "further underground." 1 29 According to this reasoning, publicizing 
a theft makes a s tolen artwork dangerous to try to sell .  This danger keeps the 
art in the thief's  hands for a long time until  the "hot" art cools down, thus 
delaying the owner's  recovery. 1 30 The Guggenheim court, lookin g  at an 
isolated case, made the mistake of using this ex post perspective in its 
balancing test . 1 3 1  B u t  the calculus changes when we move from ex post, 
individual, tactical decis ions to ex ante, societal,  strategic choices. From the 
societal point of view, it makes sense to require publicity and theft report ing 
in one case so that future thefts become less lucrative and thus less l ikely  to  
occur. 1 32 The situation i s  analogous to ransom: though paymg ransom may 
improve technologically, an owner's d uty to report specified i n formation w i l l  remai n the same . Data from 
old registries could presumably be i mpor1ed i nto new ones. Even if better methods come along, the basic 
databases w i l l  remain serviceable and solve the problems of i n formation exchange . 
I 2 8 .  A note by Deborah Hoover suggests that, to qual i fy as good faith purchasers, art merchants 
should be requi red to i nvestigate title · 'whenever the c ircumstances of a transaction cal l for further inquiry." 
Hoover, supra note I 05, at 464. Thi s  remedy suffers fram three Aaws. First. it p laces no expl i c i t  obligation 
o n  theft victims to report losses.  If  report ing  i >  not required or strongly encouraged. a buyer's inqu iry may 
be useless .  Second. the remedy apparently appl ies only to merchants. See id. at 463. Thi s  proposal could 
create a perverse i ncentive that would drive art sales out of the hands of  repu table  dealers and into back­
:.il iey transactions.  Instead of bei n g  lax about private transa.ctions, the Jaw should encourage scrutiny by 
reputable dealers. Third, this unclear proposal woul d  require i nvestigation "whenever the ci rcu mstances of 
a transaction ca l l  for further i nqu i ry." As argued, the law needs bright- l ine standards to deter theft, reduce 
l i tigation. and create clear i ncentives for both vict ims and buyers. This vague formula is subject to aii the 
objections to unclear doctri nes made above. 
1 29 .  So lomon R. Guggenhei m  Found. \'. Lube l l , 569 N.E.2d 426, 428, 43 I (N .Y. 1 99 1  ). 
\ 30 .  Steven F Grover, Note, The Need for Civii-Lmv Nations To A dopt Discovery Rt<ies in An 
Replevin A ct i ons: A Comparative Study. 7 0  TEX. L. R E V .  1 43 1 ,  1 436 ( 1 992) ("[Mjost owners fear that by 
report ing the thefts they would e l im i nate the thief's market for the stolen art and thereby force their  art 
underground . " ) .  
I 3 1 .  See Guggenheim, 5 6 9  N . E.2d at 43 ! .  
1 32 .  See Frankl i n  Feldman & Bonnie Burnham, An Art Thefr Archive: Principles and Reaiization, ! 0 
CONN. L. REV.  702, 723 ( 1 978)  (arguing that, once word gets out that a large computerized database exists 
and that vict ims are uo; ing i t. the database 's  existence w i l l  deter art theft); see also Grover, supra note i 30. 
at 1 439 (not i ng that one major reason that theft databases might not deter art theft i s  that many victims do 
not report thefts). 
A n  dealers face an analogous collective action problem under a regime that does not pen a l ize selkr:, 
of stolen art. If an i ndi v idual art dealer i n q u r res about the provena01ce of an artwork that he warHs to buy. 
he must bear the cost of  i nvestigation .  !f  he d iscovers that the artwork was stolen and �efuses to buy it. che 
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benefit an i n d iv i dual  owner, it winds u p  h armi n g  future owners because the 
expectat ion of  ransom encourages more thefts . 1 33 B ut judges m i s s  this point  
because they act e x  post  and case b y  case ,  as the Guggenhe im court ' s  
misgu ided reasoning exempl ifies .  T herefore,  we c annot count on c ase- by-case 
i nquiry to generate an optimal amount of  detenence . 
I n  s u m ,  flexibi l i ty i s  a l i ab i l ity when one i s  try ing to generate predictable 
i ncentives and deterrence.  Instead of flexibi l i ty and vague admon i ti o n s  to be 
di l igent,  we need bright- l ine rules.  Because buyers are, as a c l as s .  better able 
ro avoid losses and more blameworthy than owners who have reported thefts ,  
the law should place the burden of i nvestigation on possessors.  
We h ave al most come ful l  c ircl e .  In  the n ineteenth c e ntury. courts 
abandoned the common law's  absolute protection of owners by adopti n g  
adverse possession of c hatte l s .  That  ru le  has eroded ever  s ince .  as courts have 
become i ncreas ingly  concerned with fairness to theft victims and discourag i n g  
theft .  T h e  cunent doctrinal muddle,  however, i s  unsatisfactory. I t  i s  t i me to 
return to a rule  as c lear and s i mp l e  as the com mon law, but one that c reates 
strong i ncentives for buyers and owners to use modern information technology. 
The next Part sets out such a rule. 
III.  ABOLISHING PROTECTION FOR B UYERS OF REPORTED STOLEN A RT 
Congress should c lean up the m uddled state of the law by adopt i n g  a 
bright- l ine rule . 1 3� Though state legis latures or courts could adopt re forms,  
congressional  legis lat ion would assure c l arity and u n i formi ty. 1 .;5 This Note ' s  
proposal i s  s i mple : If a n  owner h a s  p romptly notifi ed t h e  poi ice a n d  the art­
t heft database , she should face no legal b ars to recovering her art. Jf  an owner 
h as not done so, her claim should be barred against a B FP bu t not against a 
bad faith holder. These t\VO rules are prospective ones des i g n ed to gene rate 
incentives . For thefts  that have occurred before these ru les are ado pted, d i l i ge nt 
owners shou l d  be able to recover. 
seller rnay just  sell  i t  to another. less scrupu lous Jeakr. Th us.  i n ve�tigation i s  u nproiltah!e <md hont:.:��t 
merchants labor u n der a compe ti t i ve d i sadvantage. To m·ercornc th is  disincentive. the ia'-'. sho•.!ld i m pose 
l i abil ity on sel lers of stolen art. See supra text «ccompan v i n g  notes ! (JS-07 . 
1 33 .  See 3 LYNDEL V. PROT!" & P.J. O' KEEFE. L.-\\V A\D THr: CL'! .TL'R.-\L HER ITAGE 'V!O\T\I !ONT 3 3 2  
( 1 939) 
134.  See supra Pan Il .D i"or �in explan at ion of the need for c lear ruie:; . 
1 35 .  Legislat ive ac tion is preferabk to judic ial action b·2cause of the nee<.l to I'Wdi fv federai and stat� 
statutes of l i m i tations . .  -\lso. a l eg i s lature i s  better able to hold heari ngs for c.] J  in te ;·esteJ parttes  and t.o 
announce a detailed prospect ive rule app l icab le to a l l  ca:.;e:;, rarher than j u s t  a rerro�;pe(· t i 'iC rule  for the case 
a t  hand.  Federal action i s  preferllble tn state action bccau�e trafficking in stolen an i s  !nt . .  ::qmc- t�nd 
i n ternJtional. \Vi thout a feder[!\ law. d i �p�ri!te state \a�.,·s might i nduce foru m shorpi ilg �:.nd rni ghr encot!rag� 
art buyers to Hock to the state wilh the most lax laws.  f=u nhern1ore, di\'crgent state 1 2\VS n;igf:l t 1fr'ect  
d i pl om::!tic re lati ons v.:i th plu ndered n�tions seeking to  recover [ h e i :  nat ional tr�asu:-c.s fro��·1 An1erican 
buyer�. 
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A .  Ovvners Who Report Thefts to Police and the Datczbase Should 
A utomatically Win 
Ow ners who report thefts to the pol ice  and the theft database should face 
n o  legal  bars to recovery. 1 36 The l aw ' s  prescription for owners ·would be 
c lear and s imple,  as opposed to an imprecise  command to be d i l i ge n t .  This  rule 
'-VOuld strongly encourage owners to report thefts to the p o l i c e  and the 
database.  It would strongly enc ourage b uyers to i nvestigate an artwork's  
provenance,  s ince an owner could always rec l a i m  her art i f  the art  had bee n  
reported stolen,  regardless o f  the buyer 's  good faith .  I n  addit ion.  the c l arity of 
the law \VOuld reduce l it igation costs by enabl i n g  owners to get sum mary 
judgment an d by encouragi n g  possessors to settle out of court . 1 37 
Th is proposal would w ork because a possessor can protect h i m s e l f  by 
chec king the theft registry and an owner can report her loss  to the regi stry. 
Good reg istry systems obvi ate the need for l i mitation periods . For i n stance. the 
Torren s  system of land tit le registration abo l i s hes adverse possess io n . 1 _;:; 
Ideal ly,  one would want a t it le registration system for al l  art, not  just  sto l e n  
art. 1 3 9 8 u t  that system w o u l d  requ ire p as s i ng legis lat ion 1 �'1 a n d  negotiat ing 
i n ternational treaties .  I t  would require potential v i c t i m s  t o  reg i ster the i r  
:trtworks before thefts , w h i c h  many are reluctant t o  do. 1 4 1  I t  w o u l d  also i nc ur 
huge startup costs,  anathema i n  this  era of fiscal frugality The Torrens system 
has not taken root because of its cost and i nconvenience.  1 4 '  There is  l i ttle 
! 36.  An owner. however, wou l d  st i l l  be subject to the st:.ttutc of l i m i tations after she d i scov ered the 
dttwork 's  possessor and i ts whereabouts. This proposal docs not l i cense delav in br ing i n g  suit crkc :1n 
u·x n c r  actual l y  has a l l  the fac ts needed to sue.  
i j 7 .  Compare t h i s  proposal to the current cloudiness of the law. u nder which many adverse' P'Y::;ess ion 
case:, have been l i t i gated for years. See, e.g . . Kunstsam m i ungen zu We i mar v. E l icofon, 678 F 2d 1 !  50,  
1 1 5 3 1 2 d  C i r. I 9 8 2 )  I dec i d i n g in  favor of owner r n  1 98 2  i n  su i t ti led i n  1 969 ) ;  DeWeerth v. Bal d i n ger. :�36 
i'-'. 2d 1 03 ,  1 06, I 1 2  (2d C i r. 1 9 8 7 1  (rul i n g  in favor of possessor i n  1 98 7  i n  S L! i t  ti led i n  1 98 � 1 .  cerr. Juu, cf. 
l86 U.S 1 056 1 1 9 8 8 1 :  o · Keeffe v. S nyde r. 4 1 6  A.2c! 862.  864. 067 ( N .J .  1 980 1  (re m a n d i n g  s u i t  f ikci r n  
i 976 tor :idu i t i ona! tact-fi nding i n  1 980);  S o l omon R .  Guggenheim Fuund. v .  Lubei l ,  569 N.E.2cl 42o. -128-
29 i N . Y  1 9'J i J  (remand i n g  s u i t  ti led i n  1 98 7  l·or add i t ional fact-fi nding i n  1 99 1 ) : Pcrcz-Pena. Sllf'ru nute 
: ( not ing that Guggenheim case went back for trial and was settled in  December 1 993) .  
1 38 .  See Myres S .  McDougal  & John W Brabner- S rn i th. Lnnd Title hnns(er: A RegrcssiCJn. 48 Y \ i C: 
L .J .  1 1 2':> .  i I 30 ( i 939) .  Under the Torren s  system, a proceeding analogous to a qu iet t i t l e  act i ,;n is used 
to require a l l  who may have c l a i m s  to a p iece of land to assert thei r cla:ms.  After this proceeding ,  the 
reg is try i s sues a conc l u s i ve certi fi cate of t i t le  l i s t ing a l l  i n terests in the parcel ol. land .  A l l  l ater c l a i illS rn ust 
be registered. \vhereupon the registry i ssues an updated certificate. The ] a\V does nc;1_ recog n i ze u n rc g i � �.(�red 
i mercsts . such as adverse possessi o n  that begins after the quiet  t i t l e  acti on .  To se l l  a registered pi e.:·e of 
!and.  the s e l l e r  must su rrender the oid cerriticate of t i t le .  and a nnv one is  the n i ssued to the huyc:r . .5· 
id. at ! 1 29�3 ! .  
i 3 9 .  See Hoover, supra note 1 05.  at c+5 8-59.  
i 40. See id. i n  contrast. states w i thout l i m itation period ,ratutes could adopt th is  Note ' :; propoc.ai 
_ -cnn m o n  bw developrncr;t, because theft reg i stries are �iready in pbce. 
1 4- l . Ivl any art O\vncrs try to h i de the ir  assets to avoid estate taxes. for example .  Th u ·� .  a t i :. k·  n=gi :< t ry 
\'Jouid be i ncomplete and wouid fai l .  Te lephone I n terview with Dr. Const :mce Lowenthal. Excc u l ! '- c�· 
Dirccwr. I n t ' i Found. for Art Rese:Jrch (hn. 24, 1 994 ) [here i n after Luwenthal ! n te rv i e \v j .  Musc 'J !l1S and 
governntents, however, are tax-exempt a n d  usual ly  do not try to h i de their J.ssets. so a ti t le  r�g i \ tr: !Tl i �h :  
1Furk fo; those ent i t ies .  
! 4- 2  . . S"eE DL'KE\llt\ !ER '� KRIER,  supro note i 4 , at  769. For an expLHn t i n n  of th(: Tot·;-,� n:� 
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reason to think that a Torrens system for art would succeed either. Granted ,  
artworks ,  unlike land, are created every day and could b e  registered by their 
artists without having proceedings to adj udicate the rights of  third p arties .  But  
registerin g  art already in c irculation would require giving worldwide notice to  
all  potential third party claimants and holding j udicial proceedings to  protect 
those c l ai mants . Thu s ,  a title registry for art would face the same c osts and 
inertia that have stalled the Torrens scheme. 
I n  contrast to a title registry, a theft registry requires only that theft victi m s  
report art thefts . The advent o f  computer networks and high-qual ity d igitized 
color i m ages h as made possible the recent creation of an i nternational theft 
registry. 143  A major international computerized database, The Art Loss 
Register, has been operating for three years . 1 44 The d atabase stores 
descriptions and p hotographs of thousands of stolen items i n  a central 
computer. 1 45 For a s mall fee ,  buyers can search the registry. 1 46 The Art 
supra note 1 38 .  
1 43 .  See Telephone I nterview with Rayburn B .  Dobson, Chief Executive Officer, I nt' l Registry of  
A ntiques & Fine  Arts (Jan . 26,  1 994) [hereinafter Dobson I nterview] (explain i n g  that registries were not 
feasible unt i l  recent advent of optical storage systems on computers). 
1 44 .  See ARTNEWSLETIER, supra note 97, at I .  In addition, certain l aw enforcement agencies keep 
databases of stolen art. The FBI maintains a National Stolen Arts File, I n terpol keeps a database called Art 
Program, I ta ly 's  Carab i nieri (the equivalent of the FBI) has a large database, Canada runs the Canadian 
Heritage I n formation Network (CHIN) for an i n  Canadian museums, and the German B undeskrimi nalamt 
police unit at Wiesbaden keeps a database. Grover, supra note 1 30, at 1 440 (discuss i n g  FB !) ;  Telephone 
I ntervi ew with Carol ine Wakeford, The Art Loss Register (Feb. 4 ,  1 994) [ here i nafter Wakeford I ntervie w ]  
(discussi ng B undeskri minalamt); Lowenthal I nterview, st�pra note 1 4 1  (discussin g  F B I ,  In terpol, and 
Carabin ieri ) .  None of these law enforcement databases is accessible to the public. !d. A nother private art­
theft database cal led Lasernet Theftl ine began operation in 1 990, Jensen , supra note 1 07 ,  but went out of 
business i n  August, 1 992,  Wakeford I nterview, supra. 
The Art Loss Registry is a for-profit enterprise run by the International Foundation for Art Research. 
Lloyd's of London, and the Bri tish I nstitute for the Protection of Cultural Property. A RTNEWSLETTER,  
supra note 9 7 .  Other backers of the database i nc lude Christie's, Sotheby 's, the B rit ish A n tique Dealers 
Association, and the venture capital company 3i. !d. There is no reason to supplant this private database 
with a public one, given fiscal constraints and the respons iveness of private enterprises to thei r  c l ients' 
needs. Cf Dobson Interview, supra note 1 43 (advocating private registries as way of heading off 
government regulation of the an market, which could be cumbersome and costl y  and might  even open door 
for government reallocation of art ) .  
Because the l aw wou ld require victims to use the registries, one m ight worry about control l i n g  
excessive fees. O n e  approach woul d  b e  t o  have a public board regulate fees, much as commissions regulate 
uti l i ties' fees. This approach, however, i s  on ly  necessary when there is  no competit ion to regulate prices. 
Even competition between two databases is  sufficient to regul ate prices and tenns of service. Lexis and 
Westlaw, for i nstance, hold a duopoly over on-line databases for legal research and yet have strong 
incentives to compete ior market share by innovating and offering free use to students. A nother approach 
would require The Art Loss Register to accept theft l i sti ngs for a modest set fee, but would al low it to set 
its own prices and terms of service for searches by buyers. To generate competit ion, the F B I  would expand 
its network i nto a ful l -service database accessible to the public .  B ecause theft victims would have to report 
their losses to both databases, the price of reporti ng thefts would require regulat ion . B u t  s ince thefts would 
be l i sted wi th both registries. buyers would need to check only one registry, and thus competi tion would 
regulate the ptice of buyer searches. 
1 45 .  Lowenthal I n terview, supra note 1 4 1  (stating that The Art Loss Register has 50.000 records, 
i nc luding many color images; each record contains victim's name and address, i nsurer, police report 
number, date of theft, location of theft, value (which must be greater than $ 1 000),  artist. date of creation. 
medium of the anwork, measurements, and any i n scriptions).  If, as thi s  Note urges. the law required 
registration of thefts and encouraged buyers to consult the registries, i nsurers would have a strong i ncentive 
to require the i nsured owner to fi le  photographs and descriptions with the i n surer. Ct: Russ B anham. Here 
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Loss Registry automatically searches auction catalogues for S otheb y ' s ,  
Christie 's ,  and Phillips,  1 47 thus protecting those w h o  buy from these auction 
houses .  Likewise,  galleries could offer this service to their buyers as part of 
closing the sale .  The existence of a theft registry will  enable insurers to assess 
risk and thus offer inexpensive title i nsurance . 
Under the Uniform Commerc i al Code, a sales c ontract includes a w arranty 
of good title . 1 4 8  If an owner reclaims her stolen art, a buyer can use this 
w arranty to recover his  loss, i . e . ,  the market value of the art, from the 
merchant. 1 49 Thu s ,  once the law guaranteed the owner 's  recovery of her art 
and the buyer 's  receipt of an i n demnity, galleries and auction houses would 
i nvestigate title for buyers . 1 50 As noted, merchants are well-placed to 
investigate, spread losses, and i nsure against losses . 1 5 1  Therefore, the law 
should p l ace the risk of loss on buyers because the actual incidence of that loss 
w i l l  fall on merchants and because doing so will encourage buyers to buy from 
reputable, solvent merchants who investigate . 1 5 2  
One might argue that checking title i n  all  c ircumstances would be unduly 
burdensome and costly. However, there is  l ittle reason to believe that this is 
true, given that The Art Loss Register automatically checks every item offered 
for sale at maj or gal leries and auction houses .  Moreover, the l aw would not  
d irectly require buyers (or merchants) to investigate; but,  by imposing strict 
l iability upon them, it would give them extremely strong incentives to 
Today, Gone ](Jmorrow: Fine Art Losses Can Be Mitigated by Upgrading Security and Raording rhe 
!denriry of Each Piece, INS.  REV . . Oct.  1 990, at 53 ,  58  (cit ing Dr. Constance Lowenthal, who argues that 
good recordkeeping " ' would so improve the chances of recovery that i nsurance companies could consider 
g iv ing  di scou nts to those who do i t"') .  Indeed, insurance companies could go fUI1her and demand color 
photographs of all i nsured items. 
1 46 .  ARTNEWSLETTER, supra note 97, at 1 .  Individual theft victi ms can register thefts i n  The Art Loss 
Register for $40 per i te m .  Prospective buyers can request searches for $50 per item. I nsurance companies 
negotiate contracts providing for u n l i mited use of the database for $4000 to $40,000 per year. The auction 
houses of Sotheby 's, Christie's, and Phi l l ips pay an undisclosed fee for automatic searching of  the i r  auction 
catalogues for painti ngs and drawings. Lowenthal I n terview, supra note 1 4 1 .  Note that the registry keeps 
track of "when,  why, and by whom any i nquiry i s  made. Tracking a stolen at1work even through people 
who refuse to handle it for sale i s  key to i ts recovery . ." ARTNEWSLETTER, supra note 97,  ;:�t I .  
1 47 .  Lowenthal Interview, supra note 1 4 1 .  
1 48 .  U.C.C.  § 2 - 3 1 2( l )(a) ( 1 988) ;  see Hoover, supra note 1 05 ,  at 449-50. 
1 49 .  E g . ,  Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y. S .2d 804, 807-08, 820 (Sup. Ct. 1 966) c�mnouncing jury verdict 
award i n g  possessor $22,500 market value, not $4000 purchase price, from gallery that sold painting to 
h im).  modified, 279 N Y.S . 2 d  608 (App . Div. 1 967), modification rev 'd, 246 N .E.2d 742 ( N . Y. 1 969) .  
Statutes of l i mitations shoul d  not i mpede such claims, as long as the l i m i tation period does not beg i n  
runn in g  u n t i l  discovery of t h e  defect i n  t it le.  Cf DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1 4. at 649 (noting that, 
in  contract for sale of land, statute of l i m i tations for covenants of general warranty and quiet e njoyment 
does not heg i n  to run until  some future act, such as assertion of superior tit le, d isturbs buyer 's  ownership) .  
1 50. See generally Hoover, supra note 1 05 .  
1 5 ! .  See supra text accompany i ng notes I 05-07. O n e  might argue that placing l iabi l ity on buyers who 
'.v i i i  get i<1dem ni ties from merchants woul d  dri ve a wedge between the two, souring their relationship. This 
fear i s  unfounded. Both buyers and merchants would want to i nsure that art has not been stolen. Merchants. 
by making title searches a routine  part of closin g  sales, would safeguard both themselves and their 
customers. It would be i n  merchants' economi c  i nterests to keep the i r  customers happy and to avoid the 
l iabi l i ty that would attach to sel l i n g  stolen art. 
1 52 .  See supra notes 1 05-07 and accompanyi n g  text. 
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i nvestigate . 1 5 3  B uyers (or merchants) could then weigh the costs and benefits 
of searching through databases .  If a painting had come directly from the artist, 
and the artist ver i fied its title, the c osts of c hecking would outweigh the 
benefits and so merchants would not check databases. In most c ircu mstances,  
however, provenance is  suffi c iently u nprovable to j ustify a merchant 's  adopting 
a prophylactic rule requiring a search for virtually every piece of  art sold.  
Indeed, this Note 's  proposal would be cheaper than those that do not 
spec ify what steps theft v ictims must take. Webb,  for instance, says that theft 
victims should have to "seek the best help available," suggest ing that they 
should avail themselves of a plethora of method s . 1 54 In  contrast, this Note ' s  
proposal,  by laying out two necessary and sufficient steps for owners t o  take, 
would avoid  needless duplication of report ing.  B y  concentratin g  d ata i n  one or 
two repositories,  th i s  proposal would tell buyers and owners exactly where to 
share information and so would min imize the c osts of investigating and 
reporti ng.  
The Guggenheim case 1 55 highl ights one problem that registries would 
fac e .  In that case, the museum was uncertain of the date of the theft because 
the paint ing was stolen from storage. 156 Large museums, which may have 
m i l l ions of artworks.  display only about one tenth of their collections at any 
one t ime.  The rest  often stays in storage for years, where thefts may go 
unnoticed . 1 57 Thus, before an inventory revealed a theft, a thief could resel l  
a stolen artvvork to a BFP, who would be unable to find out about the theft 
(unless a catalogue ra isonne noted the museum ' s  ownership) .  
The b l ameless BFP seems to deserve protection in this  case, especi al l y  if  
no caralogue m isonne l i sts the painting.  Nevertheless ,  sound pol icy reasons 
favor giv ing theft victims a grace period in which to discover and report a 
theft. First, i f  the law protected a BFP, it would create an incentive for thieves 
to set up col lus ive transfers to launder art quickly before an owner could report 
;:t theft .  It might be d iffic u lt ex post to d isti nguish blameless buyers from 
opportun istic fencers. A grace period, on the contrary, would c h i l l  hasty and 
:suspic ious purchases. Second, art merchants could carry i ns urance,  protecting 
buyers agai n st the possibi lity of a recent theft and spreading the costs of theft. 
I S J .  In practice, as the rest of the paragraph i n  the main text argues, the disti nction would not be 
te rri b l y  i m portant. ;vr y poin t  i s  that buyers would be free to undertake an economical ly effic ient  level of 
: n  '<cst igatinn. which i n  practice would generally amount to routine i nvestigation. Note also that the l i abi l i ty 
t:i n"t perfe c t l y  strict ; as Part I I J . B  argues, buyers who do not i nvestigate should prevail over victims who 
do il Ot report their losses.  
i 5.f .  See Webb, supra note 7 ,  at '697. 
1 55 .  Solomon R .  Guggen heim Found.  v. Lube l l .  569 N , E.2d 426 (N.Y. I 99 1 ) .  
I 56 .  See 1d .  a t  428 .  While t h e  the ft must  h3.ve occurred between ! 965 and 1 967, the  museum claimed 
that i t  d i u  not know of  the the ft unti l it completed its decennial i nventory in 1 970.  !d. 
1 57 .  Te lephone I n terview w i th E l izabeth Reynolds, Chief Registrar, Brooklyn Museum (Jan. 20, 1 994) 
[ hc re i n ; t fter Reynolds i n tervie'.v j .  It is. however. reasonable to expect individual theft vict i m s  to repon thefts 
w i i h i n  a i·ev.' weeks. Li kewise.  once a victim has learned that a theft has occurred, that victi m needs only 
' '  -,·cry short t im�,  perhaps one or two weeks, to report the theft. The only problem is  guaranteeing that 
: n :- r i tu t io td vict ims have enough time to di scover the i r  losses before the l imitation period expires.  
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Giving owners a short grace period would create incentives for them to 
inventory collections frequently and repmt thefts promptly.  G i ven the advem 
of bar code systems that faci l i tate computer-aided i n ventories ,  a s ix-mon tli  or 
one-year grace period for museums might be reason able .  1 58 (A better way to 
solve this problem would be to computerize museum catalogues and l ink them 
to theft databases,  effectively creating a t i tle registry for museum s .  One 
company, the International Registry of Antiques and Fine Arts , is trying to 
catalogue museum collections . 1 59 As argued, h o wever, such t i tle regi stries 
may not be practicable or widespread in the near future . Y 60 
I n  short, theft registries allow an owner to p u blic ize her loss and enable 
a buyer to check the title to his purchase. Placing l i abi l ity on buyers and thus 
effectively o n  merchants would encourage merc h ants ,  the least cost avoiders, 
to s top trafficking in stolen art. 1 6 1 And by depress ing demand for stolen art , 
this Note 's  proposal would diminish the incentives to steal and hence reduce 
art thefts .  
B .  0Hmers Who Do Not Repori Thefts to Police and the Database 
There are three possible scenarios in which o wners do not report thefts. In  
the first, t h e  B FP h a s  checked theft databases, foun d  n o  l isting of  the thdt,  and 
so went ahead and bought the art. The buyer should w in in th i s  situation . He 
has detrimentally relied on the owner 's fai lure to  report the theft an d has acted 
prudently in checking the database. In contrast ,  the theft vict im has been too 
sloth fu l  even to take two s imple steps to notify buyers .  Thus,  the owner in  th is  
1 58 .  Large mu�'eun1s c u rre n t l y  i n ven tory their co l lect ions  a l  n1o;-;t once e very l i '\;_· L u  t:.:: n yc�tr:\. 
Lowen thal I n terview, supru note 1 4 1 .  However, technology ex i sts that wuu!J permi t  i n ,·cmories far more: 
l"requently. ComputerizeJ bar code inventory systems arc widely avai l ab l e  th:.�t rnake it poss ib le fc>r C\"CI1  
the l argest m useums to i n ve ntory the i r co l lections once every six month .' . . The systcrn> arc s i mpl e  e nough 
that n i ght  guards could i nventory objects e:1ch night as they made the i r  round:;. One system on the market 
uses t3mper-proof. forgery-proof bar codes th:.tt frus tr:.tte attempts to remove a bar code and pbce it on 
another object. Bar code t<:�pe that contains a hologram of the p icture be i ng coJcd "" i l l  soon he �l\·a iLtblc .  
Dobson Interv iew, supra note 1 43 .  Only a minority of  museums cu rre n t ly usc bar  code < n ,·en tc>ry :'\':'tc n r s .  
Reynolds Interview, supra note ! 57 .  Bec<:�use such systems a r e  avai l a b l e  and cou ld s o h·e the prohkm or 
delayed noti fication of  buyers, the law shou l d  encourage the i r  use by i mposing a grace period :ts : ;hurt a s  
i s  feasible,  namely si x months to one year  for museums. Al tern::�ti ,·e ly. museums could set  u p  �ik' i r  O\\·n 
t i t le  regi stries and l ink them to the databases, obviat ing the need for constant  i n ventorie s .  
1 59 .  Dobson I n terview . .  wpra n o te 1 43 (stati n g  t h a t  I nternat i ona l Regi stry of Ant iques 2� Fine A rc s  
is  sett ing  up eat::�logues for the Clark Art  \luseum, the Mu se um of Americarr l nd i ;_;n .-". n .  and the 
B randywine Museum and is negotiat ing with other museums; however. that companv's  focu:; i s  on Eu.-npe. 
where European U nion law wi l l  soon requ i re national registrat ion of art ) .  
1 60 .  See supra note 1 4 1  and accompanying text ( not ing problems that  t i t le registries face but  ,:!so 
not i ng that tax-exempt museums may have fewer d is incent ives  to registe r  than ta.x-dodging pri ,·ate 
ind iv iduals  have). 
1 6 1 .  Note that merchants are only the least co;,t avoiJerc; when an owner has a l rcadv ··eported .1  rhc(l 
or the merchant buys under suspicious c i rcumstances .  When an own e r· has reported a theft. i t  be..:orn·"s 
re l ati ve ly s imp l e for a merchant o r buyer to i n vesti gate and avoid buy i ng that .s tolen :mwork: henc·c 
merchants (or buyers i n  sales wi thout merchants) arc the least cost avoiders. When et merch:mt buys rn good 
faith, an owner's fai l u re to report a theft i s  just as much ::1 fac tor in rromoting srekn an ;,.,; " buyer's u r  
merchant's  f::�ilure to i n vestig::�te. 
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s i tu ation is  more culpable and i s  the least cost avoider. To make a registry 
system effective, the law must punish those who fail to fi le . 1 62 
The second possible scenario i s  one in which the possessor i s  a thief, 
fencer of stolen goods , or other bad faith holder. For reasons of morality and 
discouraging theft, bad faith holders s hould not be able to assert the statute of 
l i mitations as a defense . 1 63 Thieves deserve no repose from the rightful 
owner 's  claim. 
The third, toughest case i s  the one in Guggenheim, where an owner who 
did not report a theft sued a B FP who did not investigate title . B ec ause both 
p arties are equally guilty of not taking action,  and because the owner's  failure 
to report did not induce the purchase,  fairness does not lean one way or the 
other. In the case of two lazy parties ,  Webb advocates penalizing the buyer 
because he l acks good faith and probably has not detrimentally relied on 
having the chattel . 1 64 B ut the l azy buyer seems no less culpable than the lazy 
owner. Furthermore, the buyer may well have relied on having the c hatte l .  This 
l ine of reasoning does not distinguish lazy owners from lazy buyers.  
Favoring lazy owners would undercut this Note ' s  policy of forcing owners 
to register thefts . Purely by chance, some lazy owners would recover their 
chattels while others would not. B ec ause of the col lective action problem 
discussed above, 1 65 owners might take their chances and not report thefts i n  
the hopes that doing so would keep the artwork from being driven 
underground. If a s ignificant number of owners did so, the incentives for 
buyers to investigate would diminish.  B ecause buyers' incentives h i nge on 
owners ' reports ,  strengthening the i ncentive for owners to report would 
encourage both parties to take appropriate steps .  In other words,  the s ituation 
i s  asymmetri c :  Placing losses on buyers would discourage report ing by owners . 
In contrast, placing losses on owners would encourage owner reportin g .  And 
because owners who report losses would automatically win against buyers , 
p l ac ing losses on owners who fail to register would encourage buyer 
investigation.  Therefore, to strengthen incentives for both parties ,  the law 
1 62 .  U .C.  C .  § 9-30 1 cmt.  9 ( 1 988)  (noting that U.C.C. 's  subord ination of unperfected security interests 
hGs "a purpose-i n  common with s imi lar rules i n  all  fi l ing and recordi ng systems-to i m pose sanctions for 
not adhering to fi l ing or recording requirements," for otherwise registry systems would be i neffect ive) .  
1 63 .  See supra Part ! . A  (d iscussi ng common law rule that thieves do not  take good t i t le) .  For these 
purposes, bad faith must mean more than a mere failure to check theft databases or other acts of simple 
negligence. Bad faith must embrace reckless and wi l lfully blind acts, for otherwise the law would p rotect 
col iusive transactions designed to fence stolen goods. To determ i ne bad faith, then. courts should look at 
a series of objecti ve factors that suggest affi rmative bl indness to suspicious c irc umstances . such as: whether 
a pai nti ng has been cut out of i ts frame; whether the buyer bought at a price so t'ar below market value as 
to be susp ic ious ; whether the buyer took no steps whatsoever to i nvesti gate t it le;  whether the sel ler's  story 
ilbout ti t le was i m plaus ible; whether the seller was an established art merchant; and whether the sale v;as 
hurried or took p l ace in a suspicious location (such as the Geneva airport, which was used to gain the 
protection of lax Sw iss laws i n  a sale of Byzantine mosaics, supra text accompanying note 80) .  
1 64. See Webb, supra note 7, at 896 (arguing that persons lacking good faith deserve no protection.  
and st ipubtively defining buyers who fail to i nvestigate ti tle as persons lacking good fai th) .  
I 65 . See supra text  accompanying notes 1 29-33.  
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should place losses on owners by foreclosing a suit by a lazy owner against 
a l azy B FP. 
C .  Dealing with A rt That Was Stolen i n  the Past 
The i mpetus behind the c lear rules described above is to generate strong 
incentives to investigate and report thefts. One cannot, however, influence 
transactions that have already taken place. Thus ,  the ex ante focu s  of this Note 
is inappropriate for dealing with past thefts. 
It i s ,  however, important to c larify the future duties of victims of past 
thefts.  To put future buyers on notice, victims who wish to retain their rights 
to recover should be required to register their thefts with the police and the 
database within one year of the enactment of thi s  proposal . 1 66 
Next, one must ask who should win as between a victim of a past theft 
and a B FP who has bought stolen art before the enactment of this 
proposal.  1 67 For reasons of morality and efficienc y, victims should usually 
win. As a class ,  buyers are at least as negligent as owners, since they often 
buy under suspic ious circumstances and neglect to investigate . 1 68 Letting 
owners rec over is  consistent with the law's deeply rooted protection of 
property rights and its refusal to treat a theft as a legal transfer of title . 1 69 
B uyers wi ll often be able to recoup their losses from the merchant who sold 
them the artwork . 1 70 Merchants of stolen art are both blameworthy (since 
they are i n  the best position to investigate title) and capable of bearing and 
spreading losses via insurance. Merchants may in turn be able to pass their 
losses up the chain of title until the loss eventually rests on the one who 
bought directly from the thief1 7 1  and so is most culpable.  Finally, 
i n ternational comity also favors protection of victims . 1 72 
C lear rules are less important when they cannot generate ex ante 
incentive s ,  though they sti l l  serve to reduce l itigation costs .  Thus, the law 
could temper this pro-owner rule with a somewhat clearer version of 
laches . 1 73 To reduce l itigation costs, courts should eschew Guggenheim's 
v ague balancing and should announce what steps by an owner automatically 
defeat a laches defense. 1 74 If an  owner took n o  significant steps to report a 
1 66 .  One year is an arbitrary period. Any short t ime period wou l d  suffice, provided it gave v ictims 
enough notice yet was not so long as to leave future buyers needlessly uninformed. 
1 67 .  As argued. bad faith holders should never w i n .  See sr;pra tex t  accompanying note 1 63 .  
1 68 .  See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
1 69 .  See Eisen. supra note 7, at 1 098-99; Hayworth. supra note 7, at 375-76.  
1 70 .  See supra text  accompanying note I 05 (discussing merchant's l iabil ity for breach of warranty of 
t i t le) .  
1 7 1 .  In theory, this  person cou l d  recover from the thief, b u t  i n  practice the thief is nowhere to be 
found. 
1 72 .  See sr1pra note 1 1 5 .  
1 73 .  See supra Part I . D  (describ i n g  current doctrine o f  laches). 
1 74 .  See Solomon R. Guggenheim Fou nd. v. Lubel l ,  569 N.E.2d 426, 43 1 ( N . Y. 1 99 1 )  (dec l i n i ng to 
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theft (such a s  notify i n g  the police or  a catalogue raisonr ui) a n d  th is  s i lence 
prej u d iced the  buyer, laches  shou l d  bar  recovery. Where a buyer has take n 
pains to investigate and found noth ing because of an owner ' s  l aziness,  the 
own er should pay for her sloth.  
CONCLUSION : OTHER T!'PES OF CHATTELS 
Does the foregoing reaso n i ng apply to other types of c h attel s ?  It would b e  
a m istake to lu mp a l l  chattel s  together w ithout further thought, j ust as i t  w a s  
a mistake t o  l ump real a n d  personal property together for purposes of adverse 
p ossess i o n  doctr ine .  Nevertheless,  many of the arguments set out above apply 
w ith great force to goods besides art. 
Chattel s for w hich there are already title registries,  such as motor vehicles  
and thoroughbred and pedigreed animals ,  are most simi lar to art. Dealers couid 
check t i t le  j ust as galleries and auction houses would c heck for art buyers . 
B ecause of the ex isten c e  of registries, buyers of these goods are the least  cost  
a v o iders.  
The argument aga inst protect ing buyers i s  somewhat weaker for other 
val uable.  u n ique goods , such as expen s i ve jewelry, ant iq ues , and electro n i c  
i tems bear i n g  serial  n u mbers .  It  i s  quite poss ibl e t h a t  abo l i s h i n g  b u yer 
p rotect ion for these goods would e n c ourage the c reat ion of a t heft reg i stry. 
Furthermore , there is alre ady a theft registry of sorts in the i n te rstate compu ter 
net\vorks of l aw enforcement agenc ies such as the FBI .  By re p ortin g a theft to 
the authorit ies,  an owner could effec t ively put buyers on n otice,  e s pecial l y  i f  
the comp uter network s  communicated with vendors.  
To u g h  cases incl ude fun g ible and inexpe n s i v e  g oods . for w h i c h  a reg i stry 
would be more hass le  than it  i s  worth.  The reason i n g  advanced in t h i s  Note 
h i n ges  o n  the ava i l abi l ity. or at least fea s i b i l ity. of· reg i s tri e s , w h i c h  e n a ble 
buyers to protect  themselves.  Vl'here there arc n o  reg i s tries and i n ves t i g at i n g 
title would be c ostly or i mposs ib le . t h i s  Note ·s  reaso n i n g  i s  l argel y  
inap p l icab le .  B ut t h e  question m a y  b e  moot. The law may n o t  matter m u c h  for 
fun g i ble and inexpe n s i ve goods . because �m owne r  w i l l  face i n s u rm o u n table 
pro b l ems in ident i fy i ng and recoveri n g  such goods .  S earc h c o sts may be h i g her 
than the good 's  value,  deterring an owner from l ooki n g  for i t .  Even if she does 
search, the owner w i l l  be u n l ike l y  t o  sue to recover i nexpens ive goods after 
several years.  Therefore , even i f  there i s  no de j ure l imi tat i on period,  there wil l  
be de facto adverse posses s io n .  
The <ms\vers L o  the foregoing quest ions are less i mpor tan t  than as k i n g  the 
ques t i on s  in the first p l ac e .  Commentators have repeatedly stressed buyer 
pr�: tection ...-vhile ignoring the importance of incentives to i n ve::;tig::tte and report 
thefts .  Perhaps the foregoing case study of art w i l l  s park debate about \vho i s  
s-:: ;: r·o ··�h c !c�tr du-� d i i igenc� r.:poning requ i rement for art thefl v ic r in1s).  
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best placed to prevent the sale of stolen goods and who is  most blameworthy. 
Only by focus ing on these questions can we dry up the market for stol e n  
goods and s o  reduce the incentives t o  steal . 
